The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
politically
weak, and his activity was inspiring intra-Shia tension. The
foreign fighters
under the
leadership of al-Zarqawi … were planning big and widespread attacks
in
the run up
to the Transition, including against the Shia.”
1003.
Mr Hoon
observed that in Iraq violence was now being used for internal
political
ends and
not solely against the Coalition.
1004.
Mr Blair
expressed a clear view there were two key issues in Iraq: the
political
process and
security, of which security was “fundamental”. In his view the
solution was:
“… a better
and quicker plan for building Iraqi capacity in the Police, Civil
Defence
Corps, the
Army and the Intelligence Service. Although the numbers
were
increasing …
Iraqi security forces were not equipped, trained or led to provide
the
necessary
capacity.”
1005.
After the
transfer of sovereignty, Mr Blair felt that Iraqis would be
reluctant to
ask the
Coalition to manage security for them and this “put a real
premium
on building
capacity urgently”. He intended to meet Lt Gen Petraeus, and asked
for
“a detailed
proposition to improve Iraqiisation” to inform a subsequent
discussion
with
President Bush.
1006.
Mr Hoon
suggested that it was possible for the UK to “demonstrate a good
model
of how this
should be done, as in southern Iraq”. Gen Walker indicated that
“handing
over
security to local control in the South would be under way in
June”.
1007.
Mr Blair
asked about the request to increase UK troops being considered
by
the MOD.
Gen Walker explained that a substantial reinforcement would take
the
Armed
Forces well beyond their planning guidelines. The Chiefs of Staff
would make
recommendations
the following week:
“… against
three strategic yardsticks: solidarity with the Coalition;
increased
influence
over the Coalition campaign in Iraq; and enhanced control over
the
handling of
the Shia.”
1008.
Mr Blair
concluded the meeting by commissioning from the MOD:
“… their
best proposals for enhancing Iraqi security capability across the
whole
country …
cover[ing] the police, the ICDC, the army and the Intelligence
Service.”
1009.
On the same
day as Mr Blair’s meeting on security, Sir Nigel Sheinwald
sent
Dr Rice a
paper written by the Cabinet Office on security structures in Iraq
after the
handover of
sovereignty.567
1010.
It proposed
the creation of an ‘NSC+’ to bring together Iraqi ministers,
the
commanders
of the Multi-National Force (MNF) and (on request) the UN
Special
567
Letter
Sheinwald to Rice, 13 May 2004, ‘Iraq: Post Transition Security
Structures’ attaching Paper
Cabinet
Office, 12 May 2004, ‘Iraq: Post-Transition Security
Structures’.
372