The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
654.
Mr Blair
emphasised that the US and UK wanted to see the UN’s will
enforced.
They did
not want to see action on the slightest pretext but they were
worried that in the
event of a
breach the UN might fail to act and lead us into another round of
negotiation.
We could
not end up where we were before – ie Saddam Hussein ignoring the
process.
655.
In a letter to
Sir Christopher Meyer on 19 October reporting two of
Mr Straw’s
conversations
with Secretary Powell, Mr Straw’s Private Office recorded that
he had:
“… touched
base with the Prime Minister, Jonathan Powell and David Manning …
As
well as
running through this morning’s exchanges they had a brief
discussion of the
implications
should it not prove possible to secure a second resolution in the
event
of Iraqi
defiance, which the Foreign Secretary noted that he had also talked
over
with the
Attorney General.”214
656.
A copy of the
letter was sent to Sir Jeremy Greenstock.
657.
The FCO
instructions to the UK permanent Mission in New York, issued
on
21 October,
stated that the latest draft of the resolution could not be “read
as authorising
the use of
force, taking into account the draft resolution as a whole,
including OP10,
which gives
a clear indication that further action will be for the
Council”.215
The UK
was
keen that
the full text of the draft resolution being discussed with the US
should be
shown to
other P5 members “as soon as possible”.
658.
Lord
Goldsmith informed Mr Blair on 22 October that, although he
would not
be able to
give a final view until the resolution was adopted, the 19 October
draft
resolution
would not on its own authorise military action.
659.
In response
to a question from Mr Blair, Lord Goldsmith agreed to
give
“further
consideration” to the implications of an “unreasonable
veto”.
660.
The meeting
between Lord Goldsmith and Mr Blair took place on 22
October.
661.
Ms Adams
advised Lord Goldsmith that Mr Straw’s comments recorded
in
Mr McDonald’s
letter to Sir David Manning of 21 October made it “all the more
important”
for Lord
Goldsmith to “place” his views “clearly on the record in
writing”.216
214
Letter
Sedwill to Meyer, 19 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Foreign
Secretary’s Conversation
with Powell,
19 October’.
215
Telegram
602 FCO London to UKMIS New York, 21 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Draft
UNSCR’.
216
Minute
Adams to Attorney General, 22 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Meeting with the
Prime Minister,
22 October’.
316