The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
deployed to
the Gulf as appropriate, withdrawing units whose tasks are
complete,
and in due
course replacing those whose tasks continue … As previously
stated,
we have
no plans to deploy significant additional forces.”
237.
On Thursday 24
April, PJHQ asked Mr Hoon to approve the first
substantial
withdrawal
of ground troops from Iraq with effect from Sunday 27
April.129
The
briefing
explained
that, of the 3,500 troops who would return, about 1,500 personnel
were due
to redeploy
to Iraq as part of future Phase IV operations; a further 1,000 were
“required
in the UK
as soon as possible for other reasons”; and a further 1,000 were
“staff officers
and other
support personnel deployed for the war-fighting phase … [whose]
jobs are
now
redundant”.
238.
Mr Hoon’s
Private Secretary commented that, although Mr Hoon had been
told
about the
proposed drawdown “in very broad outline” in an earlier
briefing:
“… what is
now proposed involves an acceleration by about a week and
a
reordering.
(It is also something of a bounce.) While it is right and proper to
bring
people back
when they are not needed, we do need to be careful not to leave
the
impression
that we are rushing for the exit leaving chaos behind; queering our
pitch
with
Coalition contributors for Phase IV …”130
239.
The Private
Secretary also suggested that Mr Hoon might want to defer
taking
a final
view until he had spoken to Mr John Prescott, the Deputy Prime
Minister,
about plans
for Operation FRESCO (the deployment of the military during a
planned
firefighters’
strike in the UK) and until he had received further details from
PJHQ
explaining
the rationale for the accelerated drawdown.
240.
On 24 April,
an FCO official told the AHMGIR that there was a good chance
the
UN Security
Council would agree that week to continue the OFF programme
until
3 June,
and agree within a fortnight that the Secretary-General should
appoint a Special
Representative
for Iraq “with a mandate including engagement in the process of
setting
up an Iraqi
Interim Authority”.131
The use of
oil revenues beyond 3 June remained to be
decided but
an FCO paper with policy proposals was being written.
241.
At the same
meeting of the AHMGIR, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, Chief of
the
Defence
Staff, told attendees that US plans were to divide Iraq into five
sectors. The
UK would
lead one sector, comprising four provinces in southeastern Iraq.
This would
be
“manageable … provided that other countries offered troops to work
with us” and
the UK
could take on a fifth province “if others contributed the necessary
forces for it”.
The southern
region of ORHA would follow the boundaries of the UK’s
sector.
129
Minute
Wallace to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 24 April 2003, ‘Op TELIC:
Realignment of UK Forces’.
130
Manuscript
comment Watkins to Hoon on Minute Wallace to PS/Secretary of State
[MOD],
24 April 2003,
‘Op TELIC: Realignment of UK Forces’.
131
Minutes, 24
April 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
170