The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
966.
Mr Benn
also reported that there were tensions within the US system over
how
much
control they should try to retain after transition.
967.
Mr Drummond,
who accompanied Mr Benn, produced a separate report for
DFID
colleagues
only.566
He reported
that:
•
Ambassador
Bremer had not seen how, politically, the Coalition could
retain
control
over Iraq’s oil revenues after transition. The Ambassador had
agreed
with
Mr Benn on the importance of managing those revenues
transparently.
•
Interlocutors
in the Ministries of Finance, Development Co-operation
and
Industries
had all favoured bilateral projects over the World Bank and UN
Trust
Funds,
because of the high UN administration fee and the lack of UN and
World
Bank
presence in Baghdad. Mr Benn and Mr Drummond had set out
the merits
of the
Trust Funds, including low transaction costs.
•
On the
future of CPA(South), Mr Benn and Mr Drummond had been
“pressed on
the need
for some continuity on the handover of authority, both by
CPA(South)
staff and
Adm Nash. We said that from 1 July things had to be different
with
the Iraqis
in the lead supported by well-targeted advice; the big money
for
reconstruction
would come from the [US] Supplemental, the Japanese and
the
Trust
Funds.”
•
Mr Benn
and Mr Drummond had also been lobbied by MND(SE) on funding
for
QIPs.
MND(SE) had said that their budget for QIPs would be almost
exhausted
by 30 June,
but UK forces could still play a valuable role after
transition.
Mr Drummond
reported: “We made no commitment … It may be that MOD
can
resource
this from elsewhere. QIPs are not high on my list of
priorities.”
Ministers
first considered reopening Basra International Airport (BIA) to
commercial traffic
in December
2003.567
In a joint
paper, the Cabinet Office and IPU advised that
reopening
the airport
would signal a return to normality and help stimulate
reconstruction. The threat
to aviation
in Iraq was severe, however, and as an Occupying Power the UK would
have
overall
liability for commercial flights.
Ministers
agreed in January 2004 that BIA should not be reopened to
commercial flights
before
there was an Iraqi Government in place (at the end of June 2004),
at which time
the
decision (and direct liability) would be theirs.568
Ministers
revisited the question in April 2004, following a CPA request that
CPA-chartered
cargo and
passenger aircraft should be allowed to use BIA, and agreed that
CPA-
566
Minute
Drummond to DFID [junior official], 24 March 2004, ‘Iraq
Visit’.
567
Letter Dodd
to Owen, 23 December 2003, ‘Iraq: Basra Airport’ attaching Paper
Cabinet Office/IPU,
23 December
2004, ‘Iraq: Commercial Passenger Flights into Basra
Airport’.
568
Letter Dodd
to Owen, 2 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Opening of Basra Airport to
Commercial Traffic’ attaching
Paper
IPU/Cabinet Office, 2 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Opening of Basra Airport
to Commercial Traffic’.
168