The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
moments but
in the long run is the only solution. Considerable progress has
been
made in
building up Iraqi military capability and further significant
milestones will
be achieved
by the end of the year. It should be possible to ensure that the
Iraqi
Government
has a near monopoly of force by the time the coalition withdraws
the
bulk of our
forces. Our ability to help them transform the National Police into
a
capable non
sectarian force will be dependent on tackling the issue of
militias. This
in turn
will be the key to bringing local police forces up to snuff
although the civil
institutions
they report to will require considerably more work.”
1073.
On 27 July,
the Iraq Strategy Group discussed whether there was “any
better
alternative
to the current MNF‑I strategy for building up the ISF and
progressively
transferring
security to the Iraqis”.991
It agreed
with the MNSTC‑I view that they “should
not give up
on the Iraqi Police, notwithstanding the obvious problems”; that
MOI reform
remained a
critical and urgent task; and that the Iraqi Army’s ranks should be
overfilled
to bring
them closer to 100 percent effective strength.
1074.
Gen Jackson
visited Iraq from 15 to 18 May 2006.992
On the various
unofficial and
semi‑official
armed groups, he said:
“Although
not wholly in the purview of SSR, these armed groupings must either
be
disbanded
or integrated into the national security structure. The militias
pose by far
the hardest
challenge and before there is any chance of DDR or integration
into
the ISF,
formal political engagement with the associated political leaders
of these
groups is
required: a priority task for the new government.”
1075.
When they met
on 22 May, Mr Blair asked Prime Minister Maliki how the
issue
of militias
could be best addressed.993
Mr Maliki
“favoured extensive dialogue, including
with
extremists, so long as they had not shed Iraqi blood”; terrorists
should “be dealt
with
forcefully”. There was “a consensus on militias, which all parties
had now agreed
to disband”
but it would be necessary to find alternative employment for
current militia
members.
1076.
Mr Maliki
also said that he recognised the importance of the Ministries of
Interior
and Defence
being seen to be independent and non‑sectarian. He hoped to have
soon
appointed
independent Ministers “without militia links”.
1077.
During a wider
discussion on ISF at DOP(I) on 6 July, the following
point
was raised:
“While the
numbers of ISF looked good on paper, anecdotal reports suggested
that
absenteeism
and desertion brought those numbers down considerably. The
Prime
991
Minute
Blake to Sheinwald, 27 July 2006, ‘Iraq Strategy Group, 27
July’.
992
Minute CGS
to CDS, 22 May 2006, ‘CGS Visit to Iraq: 15‑18 May
06’.
993
Minute
PS/PM to PS/FS, 22 May 2006, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting with
Nouri al‑Maliki’.
302