The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

884.  The DIS reported on 2 March that the ISG was to be deactivated by 18 April.495 It

would be absorbed into the Combined Intelligence and Operations Centre (CIOC), which

would retain WMD as a secondary role, after counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism.

885.  Shortly before the eventual publication of the final edition of the Comprehensive

Report on 25 April, Mr Ehrman sent Mr Sheinwald draft press lines, which had been sent

to the US for “one last check” that they did not conflict with US lines.496

886.  The main points included:

• “… [S]ix new addenda … do not fundamentally alter the findings of the earlier

Report”.

• “Government has already accepted the ISG conclusion that by the mid-1990s,

Iraq was effectively free from WMD.”

• “But have set out repeatedly why existence or otherwise of WMD does not affect

the legal basis for going to war.”

887.  Mr Duelfer ceased to be Special Advisor to the DCI on 21 April.497

888.  On 25 April, the final edition of the ISG Comprehensive Report, including six

Addendums, was published by the US Government.498

889.  The Addendums covered:

• ‘Prewar Movement of WMD Material Out of Iraq’. The ISG reported that declining

security had halted the investigation and the results remained “inconclusive”.

The ISG judged it “unlikely” that there had been an official transfer of WMD

material from Iraq to Syria.

• ‘Iraqi Detainees: Value to Investigation of Iraq WMD and Current Status’.

Detainees had provided “a vital primary source of information” on Iraq’s WMD

programmes and the regime’s strategic intent.

• ‘Residual Proliferation Risks: People’. There remained a danger that hostile

governments, terrorists or insurgents might seek Iraqi expertise. The number of

individuals was small, but they remained “an important concern”.

• ‘Residual Pre-1991 CBW Stocks in Iraq’. The ISG assessed that small numbers

of degraded pre-1991 chemical weapons would continue to be found, but did

not pose “a militarily significant threat to Coalition forces”. Any biological agents

that had survived would “probably have significantly decreased pathogenicity

495  Op ROCKINGHAM Weekly No.87, 23 February – 2 March 2005.

496  Minute Ehrman to Sheinwald, 21 April 2005, ‘ISG Report on Iraq WMD’ attaching Paper [unattributed],

21 April 2005, ‘The Publication of the Iraq Survey Group Final Report’.

497  Op ROCKINGHAM Weekly No.93, 13-20 April 2005.

498  US Government Publishing Office, 25 April 2005, The Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to

the DCI on Iraq’s WMD with Addendums.

602