The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
clear at
the meeting, as it is likely to increase the political efforts to
achieve a satisfactory
resolution”.
488.
There is no
record of the discussion.
489.
Mr Straw
separately sought urgent advice from Mr Wood on the
practical
consequences
of acting without international legal authority.
490.
On 15 October,
Mr Straw’s Private Office asked Mr Wood for an urgent
note about
the
practical consequences of the UK acting without international legal
authority in using
force
against Iraq for the UK Government or individual Service personnel;
whether they
would be
vulnerable to charges relating to unlawful use of force and
therefore whether
the
legality of the UK’s actions would be determined in domestic
courts; and whether
the International
Court of Justice could have any role.168
491.
Mr Wood
replied the same day, outlining a number of potential
consequences,
including
that such action might constitute a breach of the Ministerial Code,
and the
possible
risk of civil litigation.169
He stated
that the advice had been provided “on the
basis that
we enter into an armed conflict which is clearly unlawful, without
respectable
legal
arguments”; and that it was “therefore in the realm of extremely
theoretical
speculation”.
492.
Mr Wood
wrote that, while the legality of the conflict would not be
directly in issue
either in
UK courts or the International Criminal Court, “the choice of
lawful targets would
be
difficult if the objectives of the conflict were themselves
unlawful”. In that context, it
was “not
inconceivable” that allegations of war crimes could be made on the
basis that
the
objectives of the conflict were unlawful. In addition, it was “just
conceivable” that an
attempt
could be made in the UK “domestic courts to launch a private
prosecution for the
crime of
aggression”.
493.
Mr Straw
and Sir David Manning advised Mr Blair that two resolutions
would
be needed
to authorise military action.
494.
Mr Straw
urged Mr Blair to give President Bush clear messages about
the
need for a
two resolution approach to secure support in the UN and the
legal
authority
required by the UK.
495.
Secretary
Powell told Mr Straw that President Bush had not been clear
from
the
telephone conversation with Mr Blair, on 14 October, that
Mr Blair needed two
168
Minute
McDonald to Legal Adviser, 15 October 2002, ‘Iraq’.
169
Minute Wood
to PS [FCO], 15 October 2002, ‘Iraq’.
170
Telegram
544 FCO London to Washington, 16 October 2002, ‘Iraq: My
Conversation with US Secretary
of State,
15 October’.
288