3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
•
Mr Lavrov
had argued that the resolution was not necessary given that
the
inspections
were making progress; the side statement was based on
an
unproven
premise that Iraq had WMD; contained an arbitrary timeframe
(shorter
than Blix’s
months); and unacceptably left the decision on whether Iraq
fulfilled
the tests
with the member states. The Council should wait until the
inspectors
submitted
the list of key tasks the following week.
•
Mr de
La Sablière had taken a similar position. France had “suspicions”
that Iraq
had WMD but
it could not hand over weapons that did not exist.152
493.
Sir Jeremy
reported that he had “explained again”:
“There had
to be a test of Iraqi willingness to comply. I did not think anyone
thought
that Iraqi
compliance had been immediate, unconditional and active. We
therefore
needed a
‘downpayment’ or the contract of inspections could not continue.
We
were trying
to create an alternative to the ‘serious consequences’ in 1441 … In
the
next 24
hours I would wish to discuss with all members of the Council … We
had
to maintain
the two essential elements of 1441: pressure and the effective use
of
inspections.
The pendulum had swung too far to inspections only. The
intention
of the
draft was not to provide authorisation for the use of force. We
already had
sufficient
authorisation in 1441 and related resolutions provided the
conditions in
1441
were met.”
494.
In subsequent
discussion, Sir Jeremy stated:
•
the “tests
were a ‘downpayment’ on whether Iraqi co-operation would
be
forthcoming”;
•
resolution
“1441 was deliberately ambiguous on whether the Council or
Member
States
would judge Iraqi compliance. We would want the inspectors to
report on
the facts”;
and
•
“the
timeframe had to reflect the realities on the ground and the need
for
pressure on
Iraq …”
495.
In comments to
the press after the meeting, Sir Jeremy emphasised the
need
for a
strong signal of strategic change from Iraq and strict time limits
based on
resolution 1441 not
resolution 1284.
496.
In a
subsequent telegram, Sir Jeremy commented that the US thought
the
benchmark
process was “running out of steam”, and that support from London
would
be needed.
That:
“… might
take us through to the end of Friday. But by 15 March (if not
before),
I suspect
that Washington will be ready to call a halt to the UN process, no
doubt
with some
strong words about France and Russia.”153
152
Telegram
438 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: 13
March’.
153
Telegram
439 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: 13
March’.
485