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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
253.  Following their meetings, Mr Blair and President Bush gave a joint press
conference.153 Mr Blair told reporters:
“Our forces are now within 50 miles of Baghdad. They have surrounded Basra, they
have secured the key port of Umm Qasr, they have paved the way for humanitarian
aid to flow into the country and they have brought real damage on Iraq’s command
and control. So we can be confident that the goals we have set ourselves will
be met.”
254.  Reporting on President Bush and Mr Blair’s press conference and the atmosphere
in Washington, the British Embassy commented that the “prospect of instant
victory/‘catastrophic success’ has vanished” but President Bush had reassured the
American public that victory was the only possible outcome “however long it takes”.154
That “followed days of media speculation that the war plan was flawed, that the US had
too few troops on the ground, that the Iraqi resistance had taken the US by surprise”.
255.  The Embassy also commented that managing the media had been “a sharp
learning curve” for the US administration and that the press conference had been the
first occasion “for [Gen Myers] to articulate at one sitting the gains the Coalition has
made into hostile terrain”.
28 March: one week in
256.  The MOD was informed that Mr Hoon was keen that the UK did not adopt
a “static approach” to Basra and that opportunities were actively exploited.
257.  Mr Hoon also asked for advice on the options if the attack on Baghdad
was delayed.
258.  The MOD overnight situation report on 28 March reported that the radio station at
az-Zubyar had been seized. It was not operational but would be repaired for possible
future use.155 The operation at Qalat Sikar had been cancelled.
259.  Mr Hoon informed the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq on 28 March that he had written
to selected Defence Ministers asking them to consider a military contribution to the
post‑conflict phase.156
260.  Following the meeting, Mr Watkins recorded that Mr Blair had commissioned “an
assessment of the US view of the strategic importance of taking Basra” for discussion
at the following day’s meeting.157
153  The National Archives, 28 March 2003, Joint press conference with President Bush at Camp David
[27/03/2003].
154  Telegram 416 Washington to FCO London, 29 March 2003, ‘Iraq: The First Week’.
155  Briefing [MOD], ‘Iraq: Update for the Number 10 Sitrep – As at 0600Z 28 March 2003’.
156  Minutes, 28 March 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
157  Minute Watkins to Lee, 28 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Basra’.
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