The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
253.
Following
their meetings, Mr Blair and President Bush gave a joint
press
conference.153
Mr Blair
told reporters:
“Our forces
are now within 50 miles of Baghdad. They have surrounded Basra,
they
have
secured the key port of Umm Qasr, they have paved the way for
humanitarian
aid to flow
into the country and they have brought real damage on Iraq’s
command
and
control. So we can be confident that the goals we have set
ourselves will
be met.”
254.
Reporting on
President Bush and Mr Blair’s press conference and the
atmosphere
in
Washington, the British Embassy commented that the “prospect of
instant
victory/‘catastrophic
success’ has vanished” but President Bush had reassured
the
American
public that victory was the only possible outcome “however long it
takes”.154
That
“followed days of media speculation that the war plan was flawed,
that the US had
too few
troops on the ground, that the Iraqi resistance had taken the US by
surprise”.
255.
The Embassy
also commented that managing the media had been “a
sharp
learning
curve” for the US administration and that the press conference had
been the
first
occasion “for [Gen Myers] to articulate at one sitting the gains
the Coalition has
made into
hostile terrain”.
256.
The MOD was
informed that Mr Hoon was keen that the UK did not
adopt
a “static
approach” to Basra and that opportunities were actively
exploited.
257.
Mr Hoon
also asked for advice on the options if the attack on
Baghdad
was delayed.
258.
The MOD
overnight situation report on 28 March reported that the radio
station at
az-Zubyar
had been seized. It was not operational but would be repaired for
possible
future
use.155
The
operation at Qalat Sikar had been cancelled.
259.
Mr Hoon
informed the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq on 28 March that he had
written
to selected
Defence Ministers asking them to consider a military contribution
to the
260.
Following the
meeting, Mr Watkins recorded that Mr Blair had
commissioned “an
assessment
of the US view of the strategic importance of taking Basra” for
discussion
at the
following day’s meeting.157
153
The
National Archives, 28 March 2003, Joint press
conference with President Bush at Camp David
[27/03/2003].
154
Telegram
416 Washington to FCO London, 29 March 2003, ‘Iraq: The First
Week’.
155
Briefing
[MOD], ‘Iraq: Update for the Number 10 Sitrep – As at 0600Z 28
March 2003’.
156
Minutes, 28
March 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
157
Minute
Watkins to Lee, 28 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Basra’.
44