9.5 | June 2006 to 27 June 2007

929. Mr McDonald annotated the submission on 21 June that he supported the

recommendation on the basis that only two ‘orange’ prisoners were released at that

point, with further releases being decided against the effectiveness of the month long

ceasefire, and that the US and the Iraqi Government should be briefed soon.

930. Mr Richmond agreed with these comments, and was able to confirm on 22 June

that Mr Browne had agreed to the proposals.

931. A meeting took place on 21 June between JAM1 and government officials working

closely with the military.506 Although “the atmospherics were good” the officials had no

news so far about releases and could only say that London had decided to consider all

four releases at the same time. Once the principle had been established, they expected

that further releases “should prove easier”.

932. The officials raised the heavy IDF that had followed the end of the trial cease‑fire

and caused the death of a UK soldier.507 JAM1 said that he regretted the death and that

had the two detainee releases taken place as he had requested, he might have been

able to contain the violence.

933. JAM1 noted that the negotiation process was becoming more widely known and

made a “clear linkage” with transfer to PIC “saying, in effect, that our peace process

would enable the transfer of the security portfolio to the Iraqis”. The officials asked

JAM1 to consider ways in which he might guarantee the security of certain specific

development projects in Basra, in particular hospitals.

934. A senior government official specialising in the Middle East (2) responded that the

meeting with JAM1 had gone as well as could be expected and that JAM1 was “not out

of the game yet”.508

935. After the advice of 20 June had been submitted, Mr McDonald and Mr Richmond

had commented, and Mr Browne had agreed the proposals, a discussion between

officials working closely with the military and Lt Gen Lamb and Mr Asquith revealed

that Lt Gen Lamb and Mr Asquith were not supportive of the advice that had been

provided.509

936. On 20 June, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary told Mr Blair that Prime Minister Maliki

had decided to disband the Basra Emergency Security Committee, replacing it with a

new committee that would report to the Iraqi Ministry of Defence and have “operational

responsibility for all aspects of provincial security, from police through port security

to borders”.510

506 Email government official working closely with the military, 21 June 2007, ‘[JAM1] 21 June meeting’.

507 Major Paul Harding.

508 Email senior government official specialising in the Middle East (2), 21 June 2007, ‘[NAME OF

OPERATION] Submission Launched’.

509 Email government official working closely with the military, 23 June 2007, ‘SBMR‑I Requests […]

withdraw and correct [NAME OF OPERATION] submission. HMA Comments’.

510 Minute Banner to Prime Minister, 20 June 2007, ‘Phonecall with Maliki’.

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