The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

448. The DOC published its third report of Op TELIC lessons on 4 April 2006.237

449. The report contained a section on “National Issues” described as “issues that

warrant MOD’s attention due to the impact on operational capability”. Such issues

affected “not only Iraq but may have a wider significance for other operations, including

Afghanistan”. One of those issues was the UK’s counter‑IED capability.

450. The report highlighted how PIR IED and EFP attacks had restricted the SSR and

CIMIC effort, citing Maj Gen Dutton’s Hauldown Report. It stated: “The technology is

developing quickly and it is highly likely that it will migrate between theatres.” Countering

the IED threat had become a “tactical focus” and, while the MOD continued “to strive

to counter the long term threat”, it anticipated that the M* capability “should deliver an

effective interim countermeasure to the current threat”.

451. The report stated that the “system” to counter IEDs was “made up of four

elements: threat awareness; operating in an IED threat environment; disposal of IEDs;

and development of CIED [counter‑IED] capability”. For CIED capability to evolve into

“a coherent expeditionary capability”, integral components of that system needed to

migrate because “much of the capability currently deployed in Iraq is dependent upon

personnel and equipment on attachment from Northern Ireland”. If that did not happen,

there was a risk that CIED expertise would be lost when operations were drawn down

from Northern Ireland as part of the Peace Process.

452. Lieutenant General Sir Richard Shirreff told the Inquiry that, when he arrived as

GOC MND(SE) in July 2006, there was “effectively no security at all”: “Any movement

required deliberate operation to … get around the city. There was a significant lack of

troops on the ground.”238 He said that troops that could have been used on the ground

were perhaps “tied up guarding, securing convoys”.

453. Over the same period, in mid‑2005, the Army was continuing to voice concerns

about delays in the FRES programme.

454. The origin of the FRES programme and the DMB’s decision in July 2004 to defer

its ISD were addressed earlier in this Section.

455. Brig Moore and Brig Inshaw produced a paper on 18 May 2005 to inform ECAB

members on the progress of the FRES programme, prior to their meeting on 26 May.239

The paper set out the “potential conflict” between capability decisions: a vehicle that

could be rapidly deployed by air could not also be the solution to a whole range of

medium weight ground vehicles that needed replacing.

237 Report DOC, 4 April 2006, ‘Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 3’.

238 Public hearing, 11 January 2010, pages 3‑6.

239 Paper DEC(GM)/DCI(A), 18 May 2005, ‘Future Rapid Effects System (FRES)’.

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