3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
150.
Mr Straw
wrote to Mr Blair on 11 March setting out his conclusion
that:
“If we
cannot gain nine votes and be sure of no veto, we should not push
our second
resolution
to a vote. The political and diplomatic consequences for the UK
would
be
significantly worse to have our … resolution defeated (even by just
a French
veto alone)
than if we camp on 1441. Kofi Annan’s comments last evening
have
strengthened
my already strong view on this. Getting Parliamentary approval
for
UK military
action will be difficult if there is no second resolution: but in
my view
marginally
easier by the strategy I propose.
“We also
need to start working up a Plan B for our armed forces if we cannot
be sure
of Commons’
approval for their inclusion in the initial invasion of
Iraq.”45
151.
Mr Straw
set out his reasoning in some detail, making clear that it was
predicated
on a veto
only by France. That was “in practice less likely than two or even
three
vetoes”.
The points made included:
•
The
“upsides of defying a veto” had been “well aired”, including that
it would
“show at
least we had the ‘moral majority’ with us”.
•
In public
comments, he and Mr Blair had kept their “options open on what
we
should do
in the event that the resolution does not carry within the terms
of
the [UN]
Charter”. That had “been the correct thing to do”. “In private”
they had
“speculated
on what to do if we are likely to get nine votes, but be vetoed”
by
one or more
of the five Permanent Members (P5).
•
Although in
earlier discussion he had “warmed to the idea” that it was
worth
pushing the
issue to a vote “if we had nine votes and faced only a French
veto”;
the more he
“thought about this, the worse an idea it becomes”.
•
The
intensive debate over Iraq in the past five months had shown “how
much
faith”
people had in the UN as an institution; and that “far from having
the ‘moral
majority’
with us … we will lose the moral high ground if we are seen to defy
the
very rules
and Charter of the UN on which we have lectured others and
from
which the
UK has disproportionately benefitted”.
•
The “best,
least risky way to gain a moral majority” was “by the ‘Kosovo
route’
–
essentially what I am recommending. The key to our moral legitimacy
then
was the
matter never went to a vote – but everyone knew the reason for
this
was that
Russia would have vetoed. (Then, we had no resolution to fall
back
on, just
customary international law on humanitarianism; here we can fall
back
on
1441.)”
•
The veto
had been included in the UN Charter “for a purpose – to
achieve
a
consensus”. The UK could not “sustain an argument (politically,
leave
aside
legally) that a distinction can be made between a ‘reasonable’ and
an
‘unreasonable’
veto”. That was “a completely subjective matter”.
45
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: What if We Cannot
Win the Second Resolution?’
427