6.3 | Military equipment (pre-conflict)

Tranche 2.140 There were nine Tranche 1 UORs outstanding. Additional sustainability

measures of £44.75m had been approved.

286. The key issues included:

• Fuel and water distribution.

• COLPRO – the DLO was finalising its assessment of the consolidated

requirement against serviceable holdings and was initiating UOR action for the

balance. Early indications suggested “an initial delivery date of late Feb/Mar 03”

although there may be a longer lead time for some components. As its delivery

could affect the UK’s ability to “field the required capability in the anticipated

timescale”, options for the prioritisation of the available equipment would

continue to be refined.

• ECBA – contracts for an additional 37,400 ECBA plates were to be let the

following week, to augment the 30,000 in stock. It was expected that the

requirement would be “met in full by the end of March”.

• Desert clothing – 10,000 sets of desert clothing were in stock and contracts

had been placed for an additional 15,000 sets and 20,000 pairs of boots. Those

would be available by the end of March. The MOD intended to procure a further

15,000 sets of clothing and 10,000 sets of boots but it would not be possible to

confirm whether those would be available by the end of March until the contracts

had been placed.

287. The difficulties in providing Combat ID were also highlighted. That is addressed

later in this Section.

288. By 3 January 2003, a total of 242 USURs had been endorsed and 118 UOR

business cases approved, totalling £340m.141

289. Between mid-December 2002 and mid-January 2003, the force to be deployed

recommended by the MOD increased from an armoured brigade and a Commando

Group to an armoured brigade and two light brigades.

290. The military recommendation to offer ground forces at large scale and

to deploy for potential operations in southern Iraq was formally endorsed on

17 January, only two months before the possible start of military operations.

291. The only reference in the papers put to Mr Hoon and Mr Blair of the risks

associated with deploying three combat brigades and committing them to earlier

140 Minute DCDS(C) to COS, 20 December 2002, ‘Iraq Contingency Planning – Urgent Operational

Requirements and Related Issues’.

141 Minute from DCRS1d to APS/SofS [MOD], 3 January 2003, ‘Possible Operations Against Iraq UOR List,

3 January 2003’.

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