The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1.
This Section
addresses:
•
the
evolution of the UK’s non-military relationship with the US,
including the
processes
for making decisions for which there was joint
responsibility;
•
political
developments within Iraq;
•
changing
circumstances in Iraq after the main war-fighting phase of the
invasion
concluded;
and
•
the
adoption of resolution 1483 (2003).
2.
This Section
does not address:
•
the role of
the UK in the combat phase of military operations and
the
establishment
of the UK’s post-conflict Area of Responsibility in the South,
both
of which
are described in Section 8;
•
planning
and preparation for what would follow once the Coalition was
in
Occupation
(known as Phase IV), including the UK’s post-conflict
objectives,
which are
described in Sections 6.4 and 6.5; and
•
the
reconstruction of Iraq, which is covered in Section
10.
3.
The Inquiry’s
conclusions in relation to the events described in this Section can
be
read in
Section 9.8.
4.
The invasion
of Iraq began on the night of 19/20 March 2003.
5.
Mr Jonathan
Powell, Mr Blair’s Chief of Staff, and Sir David Manning, Mr
Blair’s
Foreign
Policy Adviser and Head of the Cabinet Office Overseas and
Defence
Secretariat,
sent “strictly personal” notes to Mr Blair on 21 March about
influencing the
US
“post-war agenda”.
6.
Mr Powell
proposed that Mr Blair should write a note to President Bush, to
“serve as
an agenda”
for their meeting at Camp David – the US President’s country
retreat – a few
days
later.1
He
identified three major objectives:
•
“To unpick
the Kissinger aphorism that has lodged in their heads (to ignore
the
Germans,
punish the French and forgive the Russians)”;
•
“To make
Bush think further about why it was that the US ended up with
such
a bad
diplomatic defeat …”; and
•
“To agree a
way forward on the MEPP [Middle East Peace Process] with
Bush.”
1 Minute
Powell to Prime Minister, 21 March 2003, ‘Bush
Discussion’.
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