Previous page | Contents | Next page
The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
Package 3 would mean that the UK Government would “be well placed to be
more vigorous in pressing its views especially on better regional handling and
‘day after’ planning”. If those components were not properly planned, a military
operation might “not offer a worthwhile return”. The UK “could and should offer
a contribution on the understanding that these dimensions must be better
addressed”.
Army morale. “If the Army does not participate in the biggest combat operation
for over a decade, and particularly if it is subsequently committed to a
potentially enduring aftermath task, this may foster a perception that the Army
is no longer regarded as a war‑fighting force (particularly if they are deployed
on Op FRESCO duties) and may have knock‑on effects on recruitment and
retention. It will clearly present a leadership challenge. This should not be a
critical factor in reaching decisions … but it is an issue which the Secretary of
State will wish to have in mind.”
782.  Mr Johnson advised Mr Hoon that:
“A firm commitment in principle to Package 3 should give us better involvement in
US thinking, especially in Washington, about the most realistic timings for military
action. We may find that we have more time … but this is only likely to emerge
progressively if at all. So if Ministers wished to place any caveats on the timescales
or circumstances in which they are prepared to take the subsidiary decisions, we
would have to make these clear to the US at the outset.”
783.  There would be:
“… a case for presenting visible deployment decisions more assertively, arguing that
they are an essential ingredient of a successful coercive strategy. This might not
persuade journalists to present them as anything other than a ‘countdown to war’.
But we would be less vulnerable to accusations of proceeding to war by stealth …”
784.  Mr Johnson stated that Adm Boyce had seen and approved the minute.
MR HOON’S MINUTE, 15 OCTOBER 2002
785.  Mr Hoon wrote to Mr Blair on 15 October setting out the arguments for
telling the US that it could plan on the assumption that the UK would make a
land contribution.
786.  At a meeting on 14 October, Mr Hoon asked for more work, in preparation for a
meeting with Mr Blair on 17 October, on:
a clear presentation of the key dates for visible activities, including the call‑out
of Reserves;
the relationship between this activity and the likely diplomatic process;
294
Previous page | Contents | Next page