The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Package 3
would mean that the UK Government would “be well placed to
be
more
vigorous in pressing its views especially on better regional
handling and
‘day after’
planning”. If those components were not properly planned, a
military
operation
might “not offer a worthwhile return”. The UK “could and should
offer
a
contribution on the understanding that these dimensions must be
better
addressed”.
•
Army
morale. “If the Army does not participate in the biggest combat
operation
for over a
decade, and particularly if it is subsequently committed to
a
potentially
enduring aftermath task, this may foster a perception that the
Army
is no
longer regarded as a war‑fighting force (particularly if they are
deployed
on
Op FRESCO duties) and may have knock‑on effects on recruitment
and
retention.
It will clearly present a leadership challenge. This should not be
a
critical
factor in reaching decisions … but it is an issue which the
Secretary of
State will
wish to have in mind.”
782.
Mr Johnson
advised Mr Hoon that:
“A firm
commitment in principle to Package 3 should give us better
involvement in
US
thinking, especially in Washington, about the most realistic
timings for military
action. We
may find that we have more time … but this is only likely to
emerge
progressively
if at all. So if Ministers wished to place any caveats on the
timescales
or
circumstances in which they are prepared to take the subsidiary
decisions, we
would have
to make these clear to the US at the outset.”
“… a case
for presenting visible deployment decisions more assertively,
arguing that
they are an
essential ingredient of a successful coercive strategy. This might
not
persuade
journalists to present them as anything other than a ‘countdown to
war’.
But we
would be less vulnerable to accusations of proceeding to war by
stealth …”
784.
Mr Johnson
stated that Adm Boyce had seen and approved the
minute.
785.
Mr Hoon
wrote to Mr Blair on 15 October setting out the arguments
for
telling the
US that it could plan on the assumption that the UK would make
a
land contribution.
786.
At a meeting
on 14 October, Mr Hoon asked for more work, in preparation for
a
meeting
with Mr Blair on 17 October, on:
•
a clear
presentation of the key dates for visible activities, including the
call‑out
of Reserves;
•
the
relationship between this activity and the likely diplomatic
process;
294