4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
•
If it could
“buy highly enriched uranium and essential components”, Iraq
might
“be able to
make a crude nuclear weapon in between one and two
years”.
•
To deliver
a nuclear warhead by ballistic missile, “Iraq would need a
more
sophisticated
design for a missile warhead than any it had before 1991. It
could
well have
done significant research on this while the inspectors have been
away,
and may
have even produced some parts in anticipation. With the
acquired
fissile
material and specialised parts, a warhead could be made for a
missile in
about two
years, but may well fail. Further time would allow the weapon to
be
developed
and tested to improve its reliability.”
•
“Iraq has
admitted in the past making chemical and biological warheads for
its
Al Hussein
missiles. We believe they could do so again.”
•
Iraq had
“the capability to have developed” chemical and biological
warheads
for other
types of missiles.
•
The dossier
focused “on the threat posed by Iraq’s WMD
programmes”.
•
There was
“no evidence that Iraq has supplied WMD materials or advice to
any
terrorist
organisation”.
•
Al Qaida
was “probably still trying” to develop a WMD capability: “It would
benefit
greatly
from support from a state programme. Allowing WMD to remain in
the
hands of a
regime such as Saddam’s must involve the risk that these
weapons
will find
there [sic] way into the hands of terrorists.”
791.
Addressing
whether there were differences between the US and UK
assessments,
the
briefing stated:
“It is
clear that the British and American Governments are in full
agreement that
Saddam’s
WMD programmes remains significant and growing. We are also
in
full
agreement that the international community must take action. Should
not
be
surprised if different analysts using information obtained in
different ways at
different
times come to slightly different technical conclusions – but the
fundamental
judgements
are identical.”
792.
Addressing
whether the UK’s Iraq policy had created a climate for terrorism,
the
brief
stated:
“… Our Iraq
policy is and will remain based on the imperative of containing the
very
real threat
posed by the Iraqi regime to Iraq’s people and its
neighbours.”
793.
A 19-page
briefing produced by the CIC on 20 September set out:
•
examples of
Iraq’s past obstruction of inspections and its failure
properly
to disclose
information about its programmes;
•
statements
made by Mr Scott Ritter during his time as a senior
member
of UNSCOM;
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