The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
99.
Mr Blair
thought that there was “an outside possibility of Saddam’s
regime
crumbling”.
100.
Mr Blair
and President Bush also discussed the need to provide support for
Dr Blix
and to be
clear about his role, including that it would not be for
Dr Blix to take decisions
on military
action.
101.
Mr Blair
and President Bush discussed the importance of moving
forward
on the
Middle East Peace Process, which would become easier to manage
without
Saddam Hussein,
and the need to persuade Israel not to escalate the conflict if
it
was attacked
by Iraq.
102.
Describing the
Summit in his diaries, Mr Campbell wrote that the “press were
all
focused on
Iraq, and on the line that the US had pretty much
decided”.31
103.
Mr Campbell
wrote that President Bush:
“… felt
there was a need for real pressure to build through troop
movements,
international
condemnation, really tough and unpredictable inspections, to
get
Saddam off
balance.
“… once we
made that phone call that agrees Saddam’s in breach, we had to
do
something
militarily and quickly. Quick sustainable bombing raid, and boots
on the
ground …
[I]f Blix gets dicked around, while a US or UK plane gets shot
down, we
go for
him.
“… was
clearly not keen on Blix, said he was wringing his hands and
talking war and
peace but
‘That is our judgement. He is not going to get between us and
freedom.
Once we
strike we go for it, we don’t wait …’”
104.
Mr Campbell
also wrote that, in response to a comment from Mr Blair that
he
“believed
the regime would crumble pretty quickly”, President Bush had said
that “both
our secret
services needed to be put to work to help that. They were thinking
of a list of
the top ten
most wanted as part of a divide and rule strategy …”
105.
Mr Rycroft’s
record of the conversation confirms Mr Campbell’s
account.32
106.
In
Sir David Manning’s bilateral meeting with Dr Rice, they
discussed the possibility
of seeking
an “audit” of Iraq’s declaration of its WMD holdings and pressing
for
implementation
of the provision in resolution 687 (1991) that stipulated Saddam
Hussein
must pass
legislation requiring the Iraqi people to reveal any WMD or
associated
facilities.33
That would
be a test of how co‑operative Saddam Hussein intended to
be.
31
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to Iraq.
Hutchinson,
2012.
32
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 21 November 2002, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting
with President Bush,
21 November’.
33
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 21 November 2002, ‘Blix: Conversation
with Condi Rice’.
22