The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
resources
to anything other than security. So there is no suggestion that the
UK
would be
left to foot the bill for the civil administration or the costs of
humanitarian
relief and
reconstruction in any area.”
691.
Mr Straw and
Mr Hoon reported that US planning remained “sensibly flexible”
once
the initial
phase was over and “a major part of Iraq has been stabilised”. They
advised
that US
planning:
“…
recognises that parts of Iraq will be more permissive than others
and that
security
could well be provided through something other than sectors. It
would
be
premature now to take a view on the merits of sectors for this
stage. We are
well placed
to influence US thinking with a number of military officers and
officials
embedded
within their military headquarters and in ITCA [International
Transitional
Civil
Authority]. It would be
helpful for them, and for military planners generally,
to agree
what our scale of effort should be in our medium-term
contribution
to
Iraq.”
692.
Mr Straw and
Mr Hoon advised that it would be necessary to reduce the
UK
military
contribution “to nearer a third by no later than the autumn in
order to avoid
long-term
damage to the Armed Forces” and to remain within current Defence
Planning
Assumptions:
“If Ministers wanted us to, we would need decisions now so that we
would
be able to
recommend what would have to give elsewhere.” Scaling down to
nearer a
third would
limit the UK contribution thereafter to “a maximum of around one
brigade, a
two-star
headquarters and possibly a contribution to higher level command
and control”.
They
recommended telling the US now, for planning purposes, that this
was the upper
limit of
the UK contribution.
693.
Mr Straw and
Mr Hoon also recorded that the ARRC [Allied Rapid
Reaction
Corps]
featured in current CENTCOM planning as a multi-national
headquarters that
could play
a role in post-conflict Iraq, but would be the subject of a
separate paper
(see Section 9.1).
694.
Mr Straw and
Mr Hoon ended with a section on “Setting the
conditions for
success”. The
conditions in which UK forces operated needed to be conducive
to
success.
There needed to be a resolution authorising international activity
in the
post- conflict
period; and:
“We should
also let the US know the key importance of internationalising the
security
arrangements
now so that we can reduce our commitment as set out above.
And
we would
expect US support in building a wider Coalition to operate
alongside our
forces,
allow us to draw down and eventually to provide us with an exit
strategy.”
695.
Mr Straw and
Mr Hoon concluded:
“We should
be realistic about the limited prospects of our finding any
genuine
military
capability to help us take this task on. New … Coalition partners
are thin
498