3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
the
gauntlet to Saddam by challenging him to accept UN Inspectors under
tight
conditions.
[…] introducing force protection for UNMOVIC is simply
unachievable,
even if
UNMOVIC decided to ask for it. The majority of the Council members
will see
any attempt
to ratchet up the requirements on Iraq as a device to create a
pretext for
military
action rather than an effort to get verification and inspection
under way. And
trying and
failing to obtain this sort of language would be worse than not
trying at all
because it
would create a presumption of further Council discussion and
decision
before
military action could start.”
286.
Sir Jeremy
advised that the UK should be:
“… focusing
our presentation as much as possible on WMD elimination rather
than
regime
change, and … choosing our Security Council tactics with
circumspection.
On the
assumption that our first requirement is to secure legal cover for
military
intervention
if the UN route fails, our priority should be to reactivate SCRs
678
and 687.
The Attorney General will need to give a view on the best way to
make this
legally
watertight, but to be politically effective we would need to secure
more than
the minimum
nine votes necessary.”
287.
In that
context, Sir Jeremy wrote:
“… Ideally
this [the text of an ultimatum resolution] should include ‘material
breach’
(rather
than ‘flagrant violation’) language and be under Chapter VII of the
Charter.
But,
subject to the Attorney General’s views, I do not think that either
Chapter VII
or an
explicit ultimatum is necessary to secure the legal cover we need.
[…] … in
my view
[we] should be very cautious about spelling out an ultimatum, which
could
easily be
used by others to argue for a further Council decision before
military action
is
launched. Our real objective in a resolution should be to achieve
the minimum
language
necessary to justify the use of force (without a further SCR)
without striving
for extra
bells and feathers …
“We may
need to discuss later how to handle Iraqi reaction to a
successful
resolution.
Actually getting inspectors back in would change the
picture.”
288.
Sir Jeremy
asked Sir Michael Jay to arrange for the distribution of the
letter in
London.
Sir Michael sent it to Sir David Manning and
Mr Straw’s Private Secretary “only
at this
stage. For discussion at my meeting at 12 noon.”95
289.
The letter was
marked to Mr Blair by Mr Jonathan Powell who wrote: “I do
not
95
Manuscript
comment Jay, 4 September 2002, on Letter
Greenstock to Jay, 3 September 2002,
‘Iraq: Handling
in the Security Council’.
96
Manuscript
comment Powell to Prime Minister, [undated], on Letter
Greenstock to Jay, 3 September
2002,
‘Iraq: Handling in the Security Council’.
145