10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
533.
They also
stated that the “refocusing” of the US effort from infrastructure
to
capacity-building
might have (unspecified) implications for DFID.
534.
The British
Embassy Baghdad reported the following week that, according to
a
report
issued by the Iraqi Oil Inspector General, some US$4.2bn worth of
oil products
had been
smuggled out of Iraq in the previous year.306
535.
The Basra PRT
was established on 14 May 2006, and was expected to be
fully
operational
within three weeks.307
Its first
Head was Mr Mark Etherington (a consultant
contracted
by PCRU).
536.
PCRU funded
three new posts in the Basra PRT (its Head, a
Communications
Manager and
an Office Manager).308
It was
otherwise staffed by bringing together the
existing
US, UK and Danish teams.309
537.
Mr Etherington
wrote to a Cabinet Office official on 17 May outlining the
challenges
facing the
Basra PRT, the most significant of which was a lack of
“operational
coherence”:
“Military
and civilian lines of activity are not integrated, and the
separation between
military
headquarters … and the Consulate in Basra Palace [the British
Embassy
Office
Basra] has made the formulation and execution of sophisticated
unitary
approaches
… very difficult. Our outputs are hence fragmentary, prone to
duplication
and
intrinsically wasteful of resources; and neither are they subsumed
to an
over‑arching
strategy.
“This is
because no over-arching, integrated strategy has yet been
articulated,
although
the need for one has been identified … UK ‘policy’ in S[outhern]
Iraq is
hence
little more than an aggregation of departmental approaches
…” 310
538.
While the
PRT’s work “must focus overwhelmingly upon Basra”, it should have
a
“low-key
southern Iraq co-ordination role”.
539.
Mr Etherington
advised that “reporting was fragmented and lines of
authority
divided”.
He therefore intended to establish a “Basra Steering Group”,
bringing together
MND(SE),
the British Embassy Office Basra and the PRT. Its aim would be to
“create a
306
eGram
Baghdad to FCO London , 9 May 2006, ‘Iraq: Corruption – Inspector
General’s Report’.
307
Minute
Etherington to Cabinet Office [junior official], 17 May 2006,
‘Basra PRT: Challenges and
Opportunities’.
308
Minute
Teuten to PCRU [junior official], 31 July 2006, ‘Visit to Baghdad
and Basra, 19 – 25 July’; Minute
Etherington
to Cabinet Office [junior official], 17 May 2006, ‘Basra PRT:
Challenges and Opportunities’.
309
Minute DFID
[junior officials] to Mr Anderson, 31 July 2006, ‘Iraq:
Allocation of Governance Resources
to PRT in
southern Iraq’.
310
Minute
Etherington to Cabinet Office [junior official], 17 May 2006,
‘Basra PRT: Challenges and
Opportunities’.
285