10.4 |
Conclusions: Reconstruction
86.
There was some
resistance to that new approach from other departments: it was
not
until
October 2006 that a DFID official could advise Mr Benn that “we
have largely won
the
argument that DFID should shift focus … to technical assistance in
Baghdad”.26
87.
In October
2005, the US launched its new “Clear‑Hold‑Build” strategy for Iraq.
One
component
of the strategy was the deployment of integrated civilian‑military
Provincial
Reconstruction
Teams (PRTs) into each Iraqi province.
88.
The US
initiative created a dilemma for the UK: how to meet US
expectations that
the UK
would play a leading role in establishing PRTs in the South and
that each PRT
should be a
“new venture” supported by additional resources, while not
disrupting the
UK’s plans
to withdraw.27
The
Government’s solution was to “be constructive; find
out
more and
try and influence the US approach; and … repackage our effort in
the South
as a PRT
but not do very much differently”.28
UK plans
for withdrawal would not change.
89.
The UK‑led PRT
in Basra was established in May 2006, by bringing
together
existing
US, UK and Danish programme teams.
90.
An FCO paper
described the situation in Basra at that time:
“Security
and governance in Basra are bad and worsening … Attacks on us,
and
both
criminal and sectarian violence, are rising. Basic services are not
being
delivered
…
“The UK
civilian effort in Basra is increasingly hunkered down. We face a
lack of
co‑operation
from the local authorities and severe restrictions on our
movement.
Our local
staff … suffer growing intimidation. Against this background, much
of our
effort –
notably the Provincial Reconstruction Team we are standing up …
can
91.
The UK’s
response to the US strategy, including the introduction of PRTs,
was
entirely
shaped by its plans to withdraw (militarily and in relation to
reconstruction). The
decision
simply to repackage the UK effort meant that the possibility of
establishing a
coherent
international effort in the South, adapted to the difficult
security environment,
was left
unexplored. The PRT was a less effective organisation than it might
have been.
The
weaknesses in the PRT would be exposed in 2008, as security
improved and
international
partners looked to it to do more.
26
Minute DFID
[junior official] to Private Secretary [DFID], 6 October 2006,
‘Iraq: Future for DFID
Programme
from 2007’.
27
eGram
Baghdad to FCO London, 22 November 2005, ‘Iraq: Update
PRTs’.
28
Minute DFID
[junior official] to Private Secretary [DFID], 1 November 2005,
‘Iraq: Oral Briefing in
Preparation
for DOP(I), 3 November’.
29
Paper FCO,
27 April 2006, ‘DOP(I): Basra’.
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