The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
634.
The senior SIS
officer concluded that the reporting was:
“… issued
against a background of possible future military action in Iraq in
which
British
Forces might participate. In these circumstances, and given [a
liaison
service’s]
assessment of his reliability, the technical credibility of his
story and the
previously
expressed Iraqi interest in a mobile CW production capability, it
would
have been
difficult not to treat seriously …”
635.
Mr Ehrman
wrote to the SIS senior officer on 1 October stating that, once
the
ISG had
issued its report, he intended that the JIC “should conduct a
comprehensive
review of
its past judgements”.254
He also
asked SIS to confirm that there were no further
questions
about other sources.
636.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald confirmed that Mr Blair had seen the senior SIS
officer’s
“submissions
of 28 and 29 September” and was “content with the proposal to
withdraw
the
intelligence concerned”.255
637.
Following a
conversation on 4 October, between Mr John Scarlett, who
had
succeeded
Sir Richard Dearlove as Chief of SIS, and Mr Straw,
Mr Scarlett’s Private
Secretary
wrote to Mr Straw’s Private Office about informing the ISC of
the decision.256
Mr Scarlett
intended to write to the Chair of the ISC informing the Committee
that the two
streams of
reporting had been withdrawn. If Mr Straw remained of the view
that there
was “an
imperative to report the fact of the withdrawals now and in
public”, a Written
Ministerial
Statement could then, with the ISC Chair’s agreement, refer to the
SIS
correspondence
with the Committee in the context of Lord Butler’s
recommendations
and the
exceptional Parliamentary and public interest in the “45 minutes
intelligence”
in particular.
638.
A draft
Written Ministerial Statement was also provided for Mr
Straw’s
consideration.
639.
The withdrawal
of intelligence was announced by Mr Straw on 12
October:
“The House
will recall that the Butler committee concluded … that the validity
of the
line of
reporting that included the 45-minute intelligence had come into
question. It
further
concluded that reporting received from a liaison service on Iraqi
production
of
biological agent was ‘seriously flawed’. The House will now wish to
be aware
that the
Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service has written to … the
Chairman
of the
Intelligence and Security Committee, formally withdrawing those
two
lines of reporting.
254
Letter
Ehrman to [Senior SIS Officer], 1 October 2004, ‘Withdrawal of
[source] CX’.
255
Letter
Sheinwald to [Senior SIS Officer], 11 October 2004, ‘Withdrawal of
[sources] CX’.
256
Letter PS/C
to Adams, 7 October 2004, ‘Withdrawal of Iraq WMD Reporting’
attaching draft Letter C to
Taylor,
‘Withdrawal of Iraq WMD Reporting’ and draft Ministerial
Statement.
400