15.1 | Civilian personnel

and good spirits of staff (many of whom extend beyond six months) in exceptionally

testing circumstances”. Mr Stagg concluded:

“a) We need to review constantly the number of staff in both posts to ensure that

they all really can add value, in a situation in which movement off compound is

so constrained. Nobody should be there unless we are clear their role is critical

to the achievement of our (very important) goals in Iraq. I am sceptical about the

impact of those trying to help the Iraqis reform their ministries on the basis of

2‑3 meetings a week. Similar work in Sofia235 (a much less difficult environment)

was impossible without having people working in the ministries full‑time.

b) We must have adequate security staff in both posts. I wasn’t convinced that the

arrangements in Baghdad are adequate …

c) We need to have a contingency plan for how to handle things if many fewer staff

(at all grades) were willing to serve in Iraq because of the security situation …”

338.  Sir Andrew Turnbull and Sir Michael Jay discussed security in Iraq at their bilateral

meeting on 29 September.236 Sir Andrew expressed concern about the situation in Basra.

Sir Michael said that it would be necessary to reconsider the terms on which staff from

different departments were in Iraq.

339.  Mr Collis reported on 30 September that arrangements were being made to

provide military escorts for CRG vehicles and to restrict movements to certain times of

day.237 He also reported reduced availability of the military air bridge to Basra Airport that

had been used in August. Staff remained under instructions to use hardened buildings

only and to carry body armour when moving around the Basra Palace site at night.

340.  The number of DFID contractors in Baghdad grew throughout 2004.238 By October,

the number of DFID contractors in Basra was also rising, reversing the significant drop

in numbers at the end of the CPA period.

341.  On 8 October, FCO Iraq Directorate briefed Mr Straw on the latest assessment

of the risks to FCO staff and the measures being taken to minimise them.239 Officials

reported that the direct threat had heightened just as the number of UK civilians had

increased with the deployment of extra DFID contractors. The FCO was “reaching the

limits” of its ability to increase effective protection.

235  Mr Stagg was a former British Ambassador to Bulgaria.

236  Minute Cabinet Secretary’s Private Office [junior official], 18 October 2004, ‘Sir Andrew Turnbull’s

Bilateral with Sir Michael Jay: 29 September 2004’.

237  Telegram 158 Basra to FCO London, 30 September 2004, ‘Iraq: The Threat to Us in the South’.

238  Letter Lowcock to Aldred, 24 June 2013, [untitled] attaching Table, [untitled].

239  Minute Iraq Directorate [junior official] to PS [FCO], 8 October 2004, ‘Staff Security in Iraq’.

303