3.8 | Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March 2003

whether Mr de Villepin and President Chirac’s recent telephone calls signalled a

“willingness to be more co-operative”, that France:

“… would still not accept a resolution that contained an ultimatum or the

automatic use of force. They were only prepared to look at timing and benchmarks.

An impasse had been reached.”228

668. Subsequently, Mr Blair stated that:

• “… the UN track was now quite difficult. The ‘elected six’ had been close

to agreement last week but were frightened off by pressure from Russia

and France.”

• There was a “slim chance” of a majority in favour of a second resolution, “but

only with a big push”: “The problem was that once it became clear … France

was going to veto the elected six saw little point in putting the resolution to the

vote.”

• The ideas put forward by Mr de Villepin were “yet another way of creating further

delays. The process was going round in circles.”

• “… France, Germany and Russia had made an agreement that they would

act together. Russia would not countenance anything other than a peaceful

solution … France and Russia were prepared to veto a resolution containing

an ultimatum or the automatic use of force.”

• “China was one step removed … they would not use their veto.”

• “… French and Russian statements that disarmament was happening went

against reality. Had the international community presented Saddam with a strong

ultimatum then he would probably have complied.”

• At the Azores Summit “they would try to give the UN one last chance”.

• “… it had to be made clear – compliance or military action would follow”.

669. Mr Blair told Mr Annan, who wanted to explore the scope for compromise

before the Azores Summit, that an impasse had been reached with France, and

Saddam Hussein would comply only if there was a clear threat of force.

670. Ms Short spoke to Mr Annan on 15 March. She recorded that he had:

“… said he had talked to every member of the Security Council and governments

across the world were ringing him saying surely one more effort at compromise was

possible … all agree time too short and should not be automatic trigger to war.”229

228 Letter [Francis] Campbell to Owen, 16 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Netherlands, 16 March’.

229 Short C. An Honourable Deception: New Labour, Iraq and the Misuse of Power. The Free Press, 2004.

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