The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
197.
In the area of
Iraq under UK control, UK forces were “likely to be faced with
a
variety of
low level military activities required of Coalition Forces by the
US to enable
SSR
implementation (e.g. oversight of recruiting procedures, provision
of training advice
and
resources)”.
198.
The SPG’s
recommendations included:
•
“We should
proceed on the basis of minimal engagement in SSR in
Iraq
coherent
with current Ministerial intent.”
•
“We should
seek clarification of where the funding for engagement in SSR
will
be
forthcoming.”
•
That the UK
should seek clarification from the US on “who will decide size
and
shape of
internal security forces”.
199.
The minutes of
the Chiefs of Staff meeting recorded that the MOD “should
remain
flexible on
the degree to which the UK should be militarily involved, but be
forward
leaning in
those areas where valuable assistance could be
offered.”159
In his
statement to the Inquiry, Chief Constable Paul Kernaghan described
the police
structure
in the UK during the Iraq conflict.160
There were
52 territorial forces: the Home
Office was
responsible for the 43 forces that cover England and Wales, the
Scottish
Executive
for the eight forces in Scotland and the Northern Ireland Office
for the Police
Service in
Northern Ireland (PSNI). Each force was headed by a Chief Constable
(or
Commissioner),
who were members of the Association of Chief Police Officers
(ACPO).161
Within
ACPO, discrete “business areas” were led by individual Chief
Constables “in
addition to
other duties”.
From 2000
to 2008, CC Kernaghan was the lead on international affairs for
ACPO in
addition to
his role as Chief Constable of Hampshire Constabulary.
200.
CC Kernaghan
had first been informed of a potential requirement to
deploy
police
officers to Iraq in an email from a junior Home Office official on
14 April.162
That exchange
is also referred to earlier in this Section. The junior official
explained:
“As you
know, we would expect the FCO, who lead on the UK contribution to
the
policing
element of international peacekeeping/crisis management
operations,
to initiate
any request for policing assistance in Iraq. No formal approach has
yet
been made.
But in view of the Home Secretary’s keen interest, I spoke to
Stephen
Pattison,
Head of the UN Department at the FCO, to find out what their
thinking was.
159
Minutes, 29
May 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
160
Statement,
9 June 2010, pages 1‑2.
161
Chief
Constables of forces in Scotland were members of ACPO
Scotland.
162
Email Home
Office [junior official] to Kernaghan, 14 April 2003, ‘Potential
police involvement in Iraq’.
102