The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
verification.
Baghdad must give the inspectors answers and inspections should
continue;
they alone
could provide answers on the extent of Iraqi
compliance.
71.
Addressing the
question of whether time was running out, Mr Ivanov
stated
that resolution
1441 contained no concrete timeframe: “The inspectors alone”
could
advise on
how much time they needed “to carry out the tasks entrusted to
them”.
Further resolutions
could not be ruled out, but efforts should continue to do
“everything
possible to
facilitate the inspection process. That had “proven its
effectiveness” and
made it
“possible to implement Council decisions by peaceful
means”.
72.
The
international community was confronting new global threats and
challenges,
and “The
unity of the world community” would “continue to be the principal
guarantee
of the
effectiveness of the world’s action”.
73.
Mr Dominique
de Villepin, the French Foreign Minister, stated that the UN
had
chosen a
policy based on:
“… three
fundamental points: a clear objective on which we cannot
compromise –
the
disarmament of Iraq … a rigorous system of inspections that
requires Iraq’s
active
co-operation and that affirms the Security Council’s central role
at each
a stage;
and finally a requirement … our unity.”
74.
Inspections
had already achieved “important results”. There had been
good
progress in
understanding Iraq’s nuclear capacity and no chemical or biological
agents
had been
detected, including in the empty warheads discovered on 16
January.
75.
There were
“still grey areas in Iraq’s co-operation” and the inspectors had
“reported
real
difficulties”. The uncertainties reported by Dr Blix were “not
acceptable”. France
had evidence
of Iraq’s capacity to produce chemical agents and the possible
possession
of
significant stocks of anthrax and botulism toxin, and possibly a
production capability.
The absence
of long range delivery systems reduced the threat of those
weapons,
but there
were “disturbing signs of Iraq’s continued determination to acquire
ballistic
missiles”
beyond the range permitted.
76.
Mr de
Villepin called for a “demanding démarche anchored in resolution
1441”
from the
Council. France did not rule out recourse to force but, before
going down that
road,
consideration had to be given as to whether the nature and the
scope of the threat
justified
force. The United Nations had to be “at the centre of the action to
guarantee
Iraq’s
unity, ensure the region’s stability, protect civilians and
preserve the unity of the
world
community”.
77.
Mr de
Villepin proposed arrangements to strengthen the inspections regime
and
to agree a
list of unresolved disarmament questions and a “demanding and
realistic
timeframe”
to address them. Iraq needed to do more. But France was
convinced
disarmament
could succeed if the international community devoted all its
energy
to it and
maintained its unity and cohesion.
192