The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“The
Attorney reiterates that such a legal basis for the existence of
the Zones cannot
justify
military action for other, ulterior motives such as action to
punish Saddam
Hussein, or
to enforce other UK or US objectives such as the maintenance of
the
security of
neighbouring states.
“The
Attorney also emphasises that it is vitally important to keep
constantly in view
the
precarious nature of the legal basis for UK and US action in the
No-Fly Zones.
It was not
yet generally accepted that there is a right in international law
to prevent
or avert a
humanitarian catastrophe … there is a considerable body of
legal
opinion
which holds that such a right was not at present clearly
established in
international
law.”
166.
Mr Brummell
stated that Lord Williams “would be grateful for a further update
of the
situation
in the north and south of Iraq, consideration of alternatives to
the maintenance
of the
Zones, and information on any civilian casualties associated with
UK and US
operations
in relation to the Zones”, by the end of May 2001.
167.
Mr Sawers
showed Mr Brummell’s letter to Mr Blair, and in a handwritten
note
which
accompanied it he wrote:
“The
Attorney has finally backed down, at least for now … But it is
going to be
difficult
to sustain at least the southern NFZ for much longer – it scarcely
meets
168.
UK and US
attacks on targets north of the southern NFZ took place
on
16 February.
The effect of the attacks is considered later in this
Section.
169.
On 9 February,
the JIC assessed that Iraq was covertly working on
long-range
missile
systems, but would be unable to achieve an operational capability
while
sanctions
remained effective (see Section 4.1).94
170.
Following Mr
Cook’s visit to the US in early February 2001, Mr Sawers wrote
to
Mr Emyr
Jones Parry, FCO Political Director, emphasising the need to
have:
“… an
agreed HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] approach, approved by the
Prime
Minister
before we go too far down the road of UK/US consultations … we need
to
have a
clear sense of what we want if we are to shape US
thinking.”95
171.
There appeared
to be three important issues “on which to clear our
minds”:
•
The
objective of the policy. Mr Jones Parry’s recent talks in
Washington had
identified
“Saddam and weapons of mass destruction as the main issues
…
93
Note
(handwritten) Sawers to Prime Minister, [undated], ‘Iraq:
NFZ’.
94
JIC
Assessment, 9 February 2001, ‘Long Range Ballistic Missile
Threat’.
95
Letter
Sawers to Jones Parry, 8 February 2001, ‘Iraq: UK/US
Talks’.
222