6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
802.
At the meeting
on 6 March, Ms Short repeated her concerns about the need for
a
UN
mandate.341
She also
stated that DFID humanitarian advisers had been
deployed
in support
of UK forces and that the DFID contingency fund would prioritise
Iraq. The
funding
available to DFID would not, however, provide for an exercise on
the scale of
Kosovo.
803.
Mr Brown
commented that the military operation would be very costly.
Estimates
for a major
humanitarian operation were running at US$1.9bn to US$4bn. The
burden
of
reconstructing Iraq should not be borne by just the US and the UK;
other countries
and the EU
should contribute. In the long term, Iraq’s oil should fund the
country’s
reconstruction.
Mr Brown was particularly concerned that UK funds should not
be used
to repay
Iraq’s debts to Germany, France and Russia.
804.
Mr Hoon
warned that a humanitarian crisis “could cause operational problems
for
the
military and expose us to public criticism”, underlining the need
for joint DFID/MOD
planning.
“The Prime
Minister concluded that:
(a) DFID
and MOD should draw up a plan for immediate humanitarian action in
the
Area of
Operations of British forces.
(b)
Planning for medium-term post-conflict action should continue on
the
assumption
that a UN mandate (the ‘third/fourth resolutions’) would
be
forthcoming.
The FCO should draft the necessary resolutions, which
we should
share with
the US. The FCO should prepare a Phase IV plan with
other
departments,
including the key decisions for Ministers to take.
(c) The
Chancellor should draw up a funding plan, including securing
funding from
wider
international sources …
(d) The
Prime Minister was prepared to pursue with President Bush our need
for a
UN mandate
for a post-conflict administration.”
806.
Mr Blair
also stated that sectorisation would need to be addressed and
should be
covered in
the Phase IV plan.
807.
Ministers “did
not have time to address” the IPU’s draft objectives for
post‑conflict
Iraq or the
principles to guide UK involvement in the short
term.342
Both
were
re‑submitted
to Mr Blair on 12 March.
341
Letter
Cannon to Owen, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Post-Conflict
Issues’.
342
Minute
Cannon to Prime Minister, 12 March 2003, ‘Iraq: post-conflict
planning: objectives and
principles’.
457