The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
full review
of their current holdings and future requirement to assess the
impact of
a shortfall.
218.
On 10 June,
that concern was reiterated to Maj Gen Richards by
Lieutenant
General
Philip Trousdell, GOC Northern Ireland.106
He
wrote:
“… it
appears that what other theatres think they require is some form of
protected
mobility.
What I require is a protected mobility vehicle which has the size
and agility
to perform
an integral part in riot control … My perception is, therefore,
that the
requests
for support are not being delivered in a coherent manner and this
has been
particularly
true of Snatch, a vehicle that has rapidly become a placebo for
many
operations.”
219.
Lt Gen Trousdell
warned:
“… drip
feeding the protected mobility requirement from Northern Ireland is
not
viable in
the medium to long term … Too often have we received requests
for
specific
equipment or specific personnel without a clearly defined
effect.”
220.
Maj Gen Richards
sent the minute to Lt Gen Fry, commenting:
“We also
need to address the longer term issue as we cannot continue to
solve the
problem on
an ad hoc basis. Given our duty of care responsibilities, should we
not
look at the
issue of protected mobility again and establish a longer term
policy that
can meet
enduring commitments other than NI?”107
221.
On 11 June,
Maj Gen Applegate upgraded the Snatch 2 business case to
an
“Operational
Emergency”.108
It would be
taken forward using UOR processes to bring
the anticipated
ISD from December 2004 to “as early as possible”.
222.
Maj Gen Applegate
wrote that the MOD was “engaged in contingency
planning
for Op
TELIC surge forces”. As a result, Mr Hoon and the Chiefs of
Staff had “directed”
that these
forces must be equipped to the same standard as those already in
theatre.
The
industrial timelines precluded any Snatch 2 deployment meeting the
“current
contingency
timetable” which meant that the Snatch 1.5 fleet had been increased
by
150 vehicles.
223.
On 12 June, a
separate USUR was raised by the Royal Engineers, for a
“suitable
vehicle”
that could be used by Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams
because
their
existing vehicle, the Snatch Land Rover, provided “inadequate
protection”.109
106
Minute
Trousdell to Richards, 10 June 2004, ‘Support to Operation
TELIC’.
107
Minute ACGS
to DCDS(C), 11 June 2004, ‘NI Support to Op TELIC’.
108
Minute
CM(BM) to DEC(SP), 11 June 2004, ‘URD 1090 (SNATCH 2 Protected
Patrol Vehicle) Business
Case (BC) –
Change of Status’.
109
Minute 22
Engineer Regiment Group to COS HQ I Mech Bde, 12 June 2004, ‘Urgent
Statement of
Operational
Requirement Ballistic and Blast Protected Vehicles for Bomb
Disposal and Search Teams
on Op
TELIC’.
40