8 | The
invasion
7,000
personnel … In addition, the Joint Helicopter Command deployed more
than
100
helicopters, including Puma and Chinook support
helicopters.”13
20.
Air Chief
Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy, UK Air Contingent Commander in 2003,
wrote:
“In all,
the UK [RAF] contributed some 8,100 personnel, together with 113
fixed wing
and 27
rotary wing aircraft to the operation; these assets were
distributed across
eight
Deployed Operating Bases in seven countries.”14
21.
ACM Torpy told
the Inquiry that the air campaign had needed UK air-to-air
refuelling
capability,
and that the US had specifically requested airborne early warning
aircraft
and air
defence aircraft for the start of the campaign.15
It had also
wanted air-launched
precision
guided weapons.
22.
Admiral Sir
Michael Boyce, Chief of the Defence Staff, was in overall
command
of UK
forces, but delegated Operational Command to Lieutenant General
John Reith,
Chief of
Joint Operations (CJO).16
Adm Boyce’s
Directive to Lt Gen Reith is addressed
in Sections
6.2 and 6.5.
23.
Lt Gen Reith,
who remained in the UK, exercised command through PJHQ
to
Air Marshal
Brian Burridge, the UK National Contingent Commander
(NCC).
24.
AM Burridge,
who was collocated with CENTCOM in Qatar, provided the link
within
the US
command structure for the national direction of UK forces, to
ensure that they
would only
undertake specific missions approved by UK commanders.
AM Burridge
told the Inquiry that he was designated as the UK National
Contingent
Commander
(NCC) in October 2002.17
In December
2002, both AM Burridge and Gen Franks deployed their headquarters
to
Qatar in
preparation for Exercise Internal Look.18
AM Burridge
told the Inquiry that his
headquarters
consisted of “about 240 people”.
On 14 March
2003, Adm Boyce told Mr Hoon, that AM Burridge’s role was “to
provide
a link
for national political control of the employment of British
Forces”.19
13
Ministry of
Defence, Operations
in Iraq – First Reflections, July
2003.
14
Statement,
14 June 2010, page 1.
15
Public
hearing, 18 January 2011, pages 6-8.
16
Ministry of
Defence, Operation
in Iraq: Lessons for the Future, December
2003.
17
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, page 3.
18
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, page 9.
19
Minute CDS
to SofS [MOD], 14 March 2003, ‘Op TELIC Command and
Control’.
7