14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
•
the
constantly evolving threat in both theatres; and
•
“a
decreased willingness, at all levels, to ‘make do’ with sub‑optimal
solutions
and
uncomfortable living and working conditions now that both
operations
[Afghanistan
and Iraq] have become enduring”.
667.
The size of
the request prompted Mr Browne’s Assistant Private Secretary
to do
“a little
digging” into the MOD’s UOR system.351
He reported
to Mr Browne:
“The UOR
system – the people who make bids on it and those who
sanction
bids within
it – are changing their attitude. There is greater willingness to
ask for
technical
solutions to reduce risk and discomfort and less inclination to
block such
bids.
Partly this is because there is a perception (rightly or wrongly)
that the political
environment
has changed, and money is no longer the constraint it was. Whilst
it
never was
for UORs/operations, many in the MOD became used to it as a
constraint
in
restructuring and that attitude bled across to other things
…”
668.
Mr Browne’s
Assistant Private Secretary suggested a discussion of the
UOR
culture
that was forming, and “whether we need to re‑steer a little or
accept that this
is the
new price of doing business”.
669.
The request on
24 November prompted a series of discussions between
the
Treasury
and the MOD about the adequacies of the UOR system.
670.
Mr Timms
was advised by a Treasury official on 9 January 2007
that:
“At
official level, MOD have indicated that the underlying reason for
the sustained
high level
of UORs is linked to a Ministerial judgement that soldiers must
be
provided
with the optimum equipment, especially where force protection is at
stake.
“HMT [the
Treasury] have never refused a request to fund a UOR. Once forces
are
deployed
and commanders are generating requirements it is difficult to deny
the
resources …
It follows that the mechanism for limiting the total cost of
operations
is to
resist any expansion of troops committed to operations, rather than
UORs to
supply the
troops already deployed in theatre.”352
671.
Mr Timms
was advised by a Treasury official on 20 April that the
“step‑change”
in the
level of UOR funding made the current UOR arrangement
“unsustainable”.353
The Treasury
had provided £2.1bn to fund UORs relating to Iraq and Afghanistan
since
2001, of
which over half had been provided in the last two
years:
“We [the
Treasury] do not question the military judgment that there is a
current
operational
need – but we believe that many of these items seek to
provide
351
Minute MOD
[junior official] to Browne, undated, ‘UOR Funding – Iraq and
Afghanistan’.
352
Minute
Treasury [junior official] to Chief Secretary, 9 January 2007,
‘Increase in the Urgent Operational
Requirements
Envelope’.
353
Minute
Treasury [junior official] to Timms, 20 April 2007, ‘Increase in
the Urgent Operational
Requirements
Envelope’.
115