The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1152.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported that “no votes were visibly harvested”. The
“body
language”
of African members “much improved” over the two days Mr Straw
had been in
New York;
but:
“We have
not yet avoided the benchmarks problem … what would
demonstrate
that Iraq
had taken the strategic decision to disarm… We could well need a
side
statement
to bring the Latins on board.”
1153.
The Council
was followed by “a long session of informal
consultations”.348
1154.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported that discussion had centred on three
questions
raised by
Mr Zinser:
•
“What did
the Security Council have to do to avoid the use of
force?”
•
“What did
Saddam Hussein have to do?”
•
“How long
did the Council have to address these issues?”
1155.
The points
made by Sir Jeremy included:
•
The core
issue was making “best use of the limited time left”.
•
The
Security Council “could not, in the light of existing resolutions …
set itself
the aim of
‘avoiding war’ … The real question was how the Council could
ensure
full
implementation of the relevant resolutions (ie complete disarmament
without
resort to
force.”
•
The Council
“should unite in exerting the heaviest pressure on Iraq so
that
Saddam
Hussein embarked on the road to peace before the road to
war
was authorised”.
•
“Indefinite
delay was an abdication of the Council’s responsibilities. Time
would
be needed
to reach ‘full and verified disarmament’; but the alternative was
not
an
open-ended invitation to conduct investigations”.
•
Saddam
Hussein “had to convince the co-sponsors and the Council that he
and
his regime
had indeed changed their attitude and taken a strategic decision
to
disarm
voluntarily”.
•
There was
“no real evidence of non-compliance on the nuclear weapons
file”.
•
The “key
question” was whether Iraq had WMD: “The UK was sure they did.
But
the WMD
could not be located because Iraq had hidden them, and they
would
not be
found without unconditional and immediate Iraqi
co-operation.”
•
The US and
UK “had invested time and money in finding out the truth.
So
we knew
that WMD were being moved every 12 hours; that mobile
weapons
facilities
existed; and that documents and materials were being moved
around.”
348
Telegram
388 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 8 March 2003, ‘Iraq: 7 March
2003:
Informal Consultations’.
388