The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
573.
Brigadier
Garry Robison, Brig Deverell’s successor as ISG Deputy
Commander,
reported on
7 January 2004 that the preparation of cases against High
Value Detainees
(HVDs) for
the forthcoming human rights tribunal had not yet had a direct
impact on
the ISG,
but had the potential to do so.318
Rules
preventing UK ISG personnel from
direct
involvement in the preparation of evidence and testimony for the
tribunal were
well understood.
574.
Mr Scarlett
informed No.10 on 7 January that the US had confirmed that Dr
Kay
would be
leaving the ISG “probably by the end of next week”.319
575.
In January
2004, in the absence of compelling finds in Iraq, the
Government
sought to
emphasise the impact of military action in Iraq on wider
counter-
proliferation
efforts.
576.
On
11 January, Mr Blair was asked by Sir David Frost
on BBC
Television’s
Breakfast with
Frost whether he
should apologise for apparently being wrong about
WMD in
Iraq. Mr Blair replied: “What they’ve [the ISG] found already
is a whole raft
of evidence
about clandestine operations that should have been disclosed to
the
577.
Pressed by Sir
David Frost on the absence of weapons, Mr Blair said: “there
is …
something
bizarre about the idea that Saddam had these weapons, got rid of
them and
then never
disclosed the fact that he got rid of them.”
578.
Asked if he
thought there was still a chance that WMD would be found,
Mr Blair
replied:
“I believe
that we will but I agree … there were many people who thought we
were
going to
find this during the course of the actual operation … In a land
mass twice
the size of
the UK it may well not be surprising that you don’t find where this
stuff is
hidden
because part of the intelligence was that it was hidden and
concealed. But
you know we
just have to wait and see.”
579.
On
13 January, Mr Scarlett told No.10 that Dr Kay’s
departure had been delayed
“to
distance it from a spate of critical WMD articles in last week’s US
media”.321
Mr Scarlett
reported that draft US press lines focused on three
points:
“•
The
departure does not mean Kay has concluded that no weapons will be
found.
•
The ISG has
more work to do on WMD.
•
Ideally,
Kay would have preferred ISG resources not to be diverted (as to
some
extent they
have been) to counter terrorism …”
318
Minute
Robison to PS/CDI, 7 January 2004, ‘Iraq Survey Group Sitrep
Number 12’.
319
Minute
Scarlett to Rycroft, 7 January 2004, ‘Departure of David
Kay’.
320
BBC
TV,
11 January 2004, Breakfast
with Frost.
321
Minute
Scarlett to Cannon, 13 January 2004, ‘Departure of David
Kay’.
538