The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
of Iraq
seeing the Iraqi Government “as a sectarian government determined
to persecute
them when
the protective US hand [was] removed”.
1197.
After
“detailed examination of the lists”, the IMOD had accepted that
“most of the
SOI”
existed and was putting procedures in place to enable payment to
foot soldiers
directly
(reducing group leaders’ income). Standardising pay was still a
problem and
recruitment
of the Sons of Iraq into the ISF was slow; only 12,000 members had
been
recruited
so far.
1198.
The British
Embassy Baghdad reported that AQ had sought to “exploit
the
situation
by increasing pressure in Baghdad and Anbar through violent
activity”. There
was “some
evidence” that AQ was trying to lure back some Sons of Iraq by
attempting
to outbid
the Iraqi Government. The US and the Iraqi Government recognised
their
continued
financial support would be necessary to keep the Sons of Iraq “on
side”.
1199.
The JIC
assessed that standardising and distributing pay was still an issue
in their
report on
18 December.1122
The Iraqi
Government had agreed to recruit 20 percent of the
Sons of
Iraq into the ISF, with the remainder to be employed in other
ministries.
1200.
The JIC stated
that some Sons of Iraq groups had been infiltrated by
extremists
and media
reporting indicated that some Sunni Sons of Iraq commanders saw
“Shia
militias as
a target second only to Al Qaida”.
1201.
On 27 May
2008, Lieutenant General John Cooper, the then SBMR‑I, raised
the
matter of
the UK’s longer‑term relationship with Iraq with AM
Stirrup.1123
He
stated:
“I am aware
of current staffing on how a future training mission might be
funded
and manned
(including the involvement of NATO) and the relative importance
of
this
against other operational priorities. I would simply observe that
we have a real
opportunity
here – both in terms of the UK long‑term relationship with Iraq and
how
we ‘sell’
our post‑TELIC posture to the US.”
1202.
Commenting on
that paragraph in Lt Gen Cooper’s report, Mr Edward
Ferguson,
Mr Browne’s
Private Secretary, wrote:
“This is a
bit of a concern. Although your intent on this is clear it seems
that this
hasn’t yet
got out of the starting blocks … I gather that the main issues are
a view
that the
Army can’t afford the manpower (because of other priorities) and
that
Defence
cannot afford it (since it may not be funded by the
Reserve).”1124
1122
JIC
Assessment, 18 December 2008, ‘Iraqi Security Forces: Mixed
Abilities’.
1123
Minute
Cooper to CDS, 27 May 2008, ‘SBMR‑I’s Weekly Report (302) 27 May
08’.
1124
Manuscript
comment Ferguson on Minute Cooper to CDS, 27 May 2008, ‘SBMR‑I’s
Weekly
Report (302)
27 May 08’.
334