Previous page | Contents | Next page
The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
“Engagement with US. The UK has no option but to use UK forces initially committed
to Phase III for Phase IV. However, accepting our intention to draw down to below
medium scale as rapidly as possible – which must be balanced against achieving
our wider political objectives in Iraq – the issue of UK responsibilities in Phase
IV needs to be concluded with the US. The UK would wish to concentrate in one
area of Iraq for ease of command and control and logistic support, this division
of responsibility has yet to be agreed formally. Agreement to an AOR would allow
planning for Phase IV to be taken forward in confidence.”
541.  The Chiefs of Staff were “invited to agree that:
“a. Our linkage with the Iraqis should reflect their system of governance and should
thus be arranged on a provincial basis.
b. UK forces should use the Joint Commission model.
c. Forces should be deployed on an intelligence-led rather than framework basis …
d. COS should take a view on the number of provinces that the UK should control.”
542.  More detailed estimates of the forces required to deliver particular tasks in the
UK’s potential AOR were included in the 15 April Statement of Requirement (SOR) for
South‑East Iraq.
543.  Sir Kevin Tebbit commented on the reference to Wasit province in the draft
Operational Concept:
“Don’t assume we will accept an AOR as defined by the US. It has to be what we
can cope with (including other countries we might be able to bring along). What are
force level implications?” 332
544.  It is not clear to whom those comments were addressed.
545.  The draft Operational Concept was not discussed at the next meeting of the Chiefs
of Staff on 26 March.333 Comments were to be sent to Lt Gen Reith out of Committee.
546.  In his Phase IV military planning guidance, also produced on 25 March,
Lieutenant General Anthony Pigott, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
(Commitments) (DCDS(C)), addressed the need to plan for the possibility that UK
forces might have to stay in Iraq in greater numbers or for longer than intended.
547.  Phase IV planning assumed that levels of consent would rise from “medium”
to “high”, while recognising that there were some areas where “low” levels of
consent could persist for some time.
332  Manuscript comment Tebbit on Minute COSSEC to PSO/CDS, 25 March 2003, ‘OP COS Paper:
Subject – Op TELIC – Phase IV Legal Issues’.
333  Minutes, 26 March 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
98
Previous page | Contents | Next page