The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
(b) having
contacted every member it was clear that Council consensus was
not
possible
within the terms of 1441, given the determination of one country
in
particular
to block any ultimatum;
(c) we
would therefore not be pursuing a vote;
(d) the
Azores communiqué had made clear the positions of our governments
on
the way
forward.”
793.
Sir Jeremy had
informed Mr Annan and Dr Blix that he would be receiving
final
instructions
“eg on whether to stop pursuing the resolution on the morning
[Eastern
Standard
Time] of 17 March”.
794.
Sir Jeremy
asked for instructions and comments on a draft statement,
writing:
“I have
assumed you will want to be fairly strong on the
French.”
795.
A team of
lawyers assembled in Lord Goldsmith’s chambers over the
weekend
of 15/16
March to prepare arguments and documents to deploy in support of
the
Government’s
position.
796.
Mr Macleod
told the Inquiry that Lord Goldsmith and Ms Harriet
Harman
(the Solicitor
General), Professor Greenwood, Mr Brummell, Ms Adams,
Mr Wood,
Mr Grainger,
Mr Davies and himself were present.339
797.
Sir Michael
Wood explained the team’s role to the Inquiry:
“Firstly
there was the drafting of the Parliamentary answer. Secondly there
was the
drafting of
the longer note that the Foreign Secretary sent to members of
Parliament,
the
so-called Foreign Office note, but it was drafted at the Attorney’s
…
“I think I
was more or less on the sidelines, because my views were known,
but
I probably
did read through the drafts and no doubt in my usual way made
editorial
suggestions
and the like, but I don’t think I had a major part in the
preparation of
those
questions of … the Parliamentary Question and the longer FCO note
…
I should
stress that by that stage, as I saw it, we were in the advocacy
mode as
opposed to
the advisory decision-making mode. This was a matter of
presentation:
how is this
to be presented in public?”340
798.
Mr Macleod
told the Inquiry that the team had produced:
“…
essentially a collection of documents to help the Attorney and the
Ministers
with a
difficult explanation in Parliament. Technically difficult rather
than politically
339
Public
hearing, 30 June 2010, page 63.
340
Public
hearing, 26 January 2010, pages 59-60.
341
Public
hearing, 30 June 2010, page 64.
142