The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“It would
be paradoxical and absurd if 250,000 men were to invade Iraq
and find
very little.”
655.
Mr Blair
responded: “our intelligence was clear that Saddam had
reconstituted
his WMD
programme”.
656.
The record
stated that Dr Blix had “concluded that he accepted the
need
for timelines
and benchmarks”.
657.
In his account
of the conversation, Dr Blix wrote that he had
said:
“Only at
three sites to which we had gone on the basis of intelligence had
there been
any result
at all.
“Personally
I tended to think that Iraq still concealed weapons of mass
destruction,
but I
needed evidence. Perhaps there were not many such weapons in
Iraq
658.
After the
conversation between Mr Blair and Dr Blix, Sir David
Manning told
Dr Rice
that while Dr Blix had understood the key point that Iraq was
not co-operating
fully with
the UN, it was “equally clear that he was not ready to say so to
the Security
Council”.180
The need
was therefore to keep him focused on this question of
co‑operation
and
“persuade him that the logic of the situation was that we should
now issue an
ultimatum”.
Dr Blix would need to decide whether “he was going to be a
party to the
pretence
that Iraq was co-operating with the UN system when, in fact,
Saddam’s
defiance
risked wrecking it”.
659.
Sir David also
recorded US/UK agreement to table a second resolution
on 24 February
and the UK’s preference for the “very light” resolution
proposed
by Sir Jeremy
Greenstock. There would be a need to prepare the launch
carefully
with members
of the E10 and potential allies in the Security
Council.
660.
Asked about
his response to Dr Blix’s comment about the implications of
invading
Iraq and
finding “very little”, Mr Blair told the Inquiry that he had
told Dr Blix: “What you
have to
tell us is … whether he is complying with the resolution. Is he
giving immediate
compliance
and full compliance or not?” Dr Blix’s answer was: “No, but,
you never know,
it may be
that, if we are given more time, he will.”181
661.
Mr Blair
added that the conversation had led to him working with
Dr Blix “to try and
get a fresh
… resolution. I kept working on that right up until the last
moment.”
179
Blix
H. The Search
for Weapons of Mass Destruction: Disarming Iraq. Bloomsbury
Publishing
Plc, 2005.
180
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’.
181
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, pages 112-113.
296