6.2 | Military planning for the invasion, January to March 2003

352. The MOD set out its position on targeting in advice prepared for Mr Blair’s meeting

with President Bush on 31 January.125

353. The MOD advised that, although detailed assessments of civilian casualties

resulting from the air campaign could be produced on a “target-by-target” basis, the

target set was not yet sufficiently well defined to allow an estimate to be produced for

the air campaign as a whole. Analysis based on estimated civilian casualties during

operations over Iraq between 1998 and 1999 suggested that the civilian casualties

for an air campaign would be around 150 killed and 500 injured.

354. No assessment had been produced of civilian casualties arising from “urban

operations in Basra”. Experience from World War II suggested that between 200

and 2,000 civilians could be killed in urban operations in Basra, depending on

“circumstances, duration and the degree to which civilian casualties are minimised”.

355. On 3 February, Mr Hoon’s Private Office wrote to Lord Goldsmith’s Office with

a paper on the UK’s military campaign objectives. It was intended to form a basis for

discussion of possible targets during an air campaign at a meeting with Lord Goldsmith

and Mr Straw the following day.126

356. The paper set out three potential options for disarming Iraq:

• Enforced inspections – military force being used to support UNMOVIC

inspectors on the ground.

• Enforced destruction (air) – a sustained campaign of selective targeting using

precision guided weapons and other aerial bombing techniques against known

weapons sites.

• Enforced dismantling/destruction (land) – ground operations enabling the

international community to take control of WMD sites.

357. Each option provided a rationale within which specific targeting or other legal

issues could be considered.

358. The paper concluded by stating that the first two options would not deliver the

UK’s objectives. The third option would require an integrated air and ground campaign

to meet any military resistance from the Iraqi Armed Forces and to minimise risk to

Coalition Service Personnel. The paper stated:

“But the key driver of resistance to Coalition operations is the Iraqi regime itself.

Not only would removal of the regime potentially bring the need for military action to

an early conclusion, the prospect of a new and representative administration in Iraq

125 Letter Williams to Rycroft, 29 January 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Briefing – Iraq’ attaching Briefing MOD,

[undated], ‘Targeting and Military Objectives’.

126 Letter Williams to Brummell, 3 February 2003, ‘Potential Operations in Iraq: Military Objectives and

Campaign’ attaching Paper ‘The Disarmament of Iraq’.

439