The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
81.
When
Mr Straw and Secretary Powell met on 20 August, they discussed
Mr Blair’s
Note to
President Bush of 28 July and its impact on thinking in the
US.35
82.
In relation to
Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, Secretary Powell told
Mr Straw
that
dossiers on the “case for action” were being prepared:
“True
believers would see a smoking gun no matter what. But most of the
stuff Iraq
was
importing was dual-use. It was not clear that the situation was any
more serious
this year
than last.”
83.
Mr Straw
handed over a copy of the UK’s draft dossier:
“Although
it made clear that Saddam was a very bad man, the contents did
not
lead
inexorably to the conclusion that the only way to deal with him was
by military
action.”
84.
Mr Straw
told Secretary Powell that he had discussed the position with
Mr Blair the
previous
day. Mr Blair was concerned and had:
“… asked
him to stress that the problem was that we had been ‘outed’ long
before
we had been
able to make the case with the public for action …”
85.
Addressing the
“public case”, Mr Straw said that the UK dossier:
“… needed a
compelling last chapter. We could make a better case than the
one
we had made
so far. Traditional Cold War-style containment did not work for
WMD.
Rogue
states did not have as much at stake as the Soviet
bloc.”
86.
On 19 August,
Mr McKane chaired a “restricted” inter-departmental
meeting
on an information
strategy on Iraq.36
87.
The MOD had
provided an outline of the shape an information strategy
might
take, with
the objectives of attaining “domestic acquiescence” and regional
and
international support.
88.
The meeting
also discussed the forthcoming International Institute of
Strategic
Studies
(IISS) report (on Iraq’s WMD). It was perceived as “useful”, but
the UK should
“resist any
calls” to publish the dossier, “which would be seen by the media as
a positive
indication
of UK preparations for a military operation against
Iraq”.
89.
In conclusion,
Mr McKane:
“…
re-iterated the sensitive nature of the meeting. It was important
that no work was
taken
forward in the absence of a policy decision, and that no action was
taken that
might be
misconstrued by the media as an indication of the UK’s policy
decision.”
35
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 21 August 2002, ‘Foreign Secretary’s Visit to
the US, 20 August 2002’.
36
Minute
[Cabinet Office junior official] to McKane, 21 August 2002,
‘Information Strategy – Iraq’.
128