6.2 | Military planning for the invasion, January to March 2003

142. Mr Blair was concerned about the plans in place if Saddam Hussein retreated to

Baghdad.39

143. Mr Blair asked for further advice on:

• which Coalition Forces were expected to reach Baghdad, and how quickly;

• a full analysis of the risk that Saddam Hussein would concentrate on

“Fortress Baghdad”;

• an account of how the US planned to deal with that if it arose; and

• what they would do if there was inter-communal fighting in the city.40

144. In addition to the defence of Baghdad, Iraqi use of WMD and burning the oilfields

were discussed as some of the worst outcomes of military action, and that “planning

was well advanced to counter” both those contingencies.41

145. In response to his question about the chances of Saddam Hussein using WMD,

Mr Blair was told that “intelligence left no ambiguity over Saddam’s willingness to use

WMD if he judged the time was right, but that as his WMD were currently concealed

from the UNMOVIC [United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission]

it would take some time for it to be constituted ready for action.”

146. Air Marshal Sir Joe French, Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI), stated that the

Coalition’s ability to detect Iraqi preparations in relation to theatre ballistic missiles was

“good, and such detections would likely trigger operations”.

147. Mr Blair asked:

“… military planners to test further their predictions of Saddam’s likely responses to

attack, and how we would counter them. In particular, this should cover Saddam’s

possible pre-emptive use of WMD …”

148. Mr Blair was reported to have asked for: “Contingency plans to be developed to

counter potential ‘unexpected consequences’.”

149. Mr Hoon subsequently asked that the work on predicting Saddam Hussein’s

possible responses to military action should be taken forward in the context of a

comprehensive “red teaming” of the military plan to identify all conceivable risks to

its success.42

150. The first report of the “Red Team” set up by the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS)

was not produced until mid-February. That is addressed later in this Section.

39 Minute SECCOS to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 22 January 2003, ‘Record of the Meeting Between

the Prime Minister and Chiefs of Staff to Discuss Op TELIC: 15 Jan 03’.

40 Letter Rycroft to Watkins, 15 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Planning’.

41 Minute SECCOS to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 22 January 2003, ‘Record of the Meeting Between

the Prime Minister and Chiefs of Staff to Discuss Op TELIC: 15 Jan 03’.

42 Minute Watkins to DG Op Pol, 16 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Planning’.

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