The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
250.
The official
recommended that existing volunteers, who were fully aware of
the
security
risks, be allowed to make preparations for their return, and that
new volunteers
be
permitted to attend a hostile environment course and deploy to
Iraq, if their line
manager
agreed. Because of the timing of courses, new volunteers would not
be able
to deploy
until at least 28 January.
251.
On 9 January,
Mr O’Donnell’s office replied that he was “keen to see HMT
people
return if
the conditions are appropriate and that people who volunteer are
made fully
aware of,
and are trained about, the risks”.174
252.
On 14 January,
Sir Michael Jay informed Sir Andrew Turnbull and
Permanent
Secretaries
that the FCO and DFID had 165 civilian staff in
Iraq.175
The total
was likely
to rise
above 200 in June, before falling after the transfer of
sovereignty. Sir Michael
provided a
breakdown of the 165 by employer:
•
37 FCO
staff;
•
23 FCO
contractors;
•
52 seconded
via the FCO from OGDs and the police;
•
5 DFID
staff; and
•
48 DFID
contractors.
He also
provided a breakdown by geographical location:
•
72 in
Baghdad:
{{50 in
CPA Baghdad (including 7 in the UK‑CPA Co‑ordination
Cell);
{{9 in the
British Office Baghdad;
{{8 in
IraqRep (the office of the Prime Minister’s Special
Representative);
{{4 in the
DFID Baghdad Office;176
•
77 in
Basra:
{{72 in
CPA(South);
{{5 in the
Basra Governorate Team; and
•
16 in other
governorates.
253.
Sir Michael
listed 14 areas of UK civilian involvement in CPA
Baghdad:
•
policing
and SSR;
•
oil;
•
governance;
•
press and
communications;
174
Email
PS/Gus O’Donnell to Kilpatrick, 9 January 2004, ‘Iraq:
Secondees’.
175
Letter Jay
to Turnbull, 14 January 2004, ‘Iraq – Civilian Staffing’ attaching
Paper, ‘Iraq: Civilian Staffing’.
176
The numbers
in Sir Michael Jay’s list add up to 71, not 72.
288