The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

974.  On 8 April, the FCO tightened their travel advice, to read: “Even the most

essential travel to Iraq should be delayed, if possible.”573 Companies involved in

reconstruction were encouraged to “ensure that they have made the appropriate security

arrangements”.

975.  On 14 April, the UK company Foster Wheeler Energy Ltd, which had been

contracted by the PMO to provide oil and gas project management services in Iraq,

informed the PMO that it intended to postpone the deployment of its staff to Iraq, citing

the 8 April FCO travel advice.574

976.  Section 10.3 describes the exchanges between Foster Wheeler, the PMO and the

UK Government, leading to the (delayed) deployment of Foster Wheeler staff to Iraq

from late May.

977.  Also on 14 April, the JIC assessed that kidnapping was now being used as a

tactic by anti-Coalition forces.575 The kidnappings, together with the rise in attacks

on foreigners over the past month, were persuading “many” foreign contractors to

leave Iraq. That could affect the Coalition’s reconstruction effort and, in the short term,

precipitate power shortages and further public discontent.

978.  On 15 April, Sir Nigel Sheinwald sent Dr Rice a “personal paper” from Mr Blair for

President Bush, which Mr Blair hoped the President might read before their conversation

the next day.576 Mr Blair summarised his strategy for Iraq as:

“• local engagement by Iraqis to sort the Sunni and MAS [Muqtada al-Sadr]

problems, with Fallujah critical;

• backed by a specific set of offers to deal with grievances;

• backed by an Iraq-wide campaign of communication, led and fronted by Iraqis”.

979.  Mr Blair acknowledged Dr Rice’s “heroic efforts” and recent improvements in the

CPA’s communications work. But:

“My point, simply, is that this issue [communications] is not just important; it is

crucial. It is at the core of whether we succeed or fail … We need a wholly more

professional and organised response. We can’t leave the field to Al Jazeera and

Al Arabiya as the satellite channels watched by the people; or fail to use the

terrestrial channels adequately.”

980.  Mr Blair and President Bush met in Washington on 16 April.577 Mr Blair stressed to

President Bush the importance of standing firm, setting out a clear political vision and

implementing it competently.

573  FCO Travel Advice for Iraq, 8 April 2004.

574  Letter O’Connell to CPA/PMO, 14 April 2004, ‘Oil Sector Program Management Contractor’.

575  JIC Assessment, 14 April 2004, ‘Iraq Security’.

576  Letter Sheinwald to Rice, 15 April 2004, [untitled], attaching Note [Blair to Bush], [undated], ‘Note’.

577  Letter Rycroft to Adams, 16 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting with President Bush’.

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