6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
“Nevertheless,
I think the arguments for pursuing the idea are persuasive.
First
and
foremost is the fact that Iraq seems to be the Prime Minister’s
Main Effort, and
aftermath
his chief concern. So far we seem to have little to reassure him.
Second,
time is not
on our side … Third, because of the way this war is being planned
in the
US, we risk
missing a major trick if we do not give the UK components the
policy
guidance
they need to inform the US planning.”
102.
A joint
MOD/PJHQ delegation attended a Phase IV planning conference
convened
by the US
Joint Staff at CENTCOM in Tampa on 23 and 24
January.55
Participants
addressed
Phase IV planning in more detail than at the Washington talks on 22
January.
103.
The PJHQ
record stated that the conference “substantially enhances
confidence
in US
planning”, but that:
“Significant
strategic issues [are] not yet resolved, including whether the
level of
ambition
evident in US planning will be matched by US political will, and
therefore
by resources.
“… The
strength of the US approach to Phase IV … is that their plan has
been
prepared in
isolation, on the basis that the US needed to be ready to go
it
‘alone,
unafraid and unilateral’. As a result it is clear that they have a
detailed
operational
model that broadly covers all the bases and makes sense.
Conversely,
the
weakness of the US approach is that the plan has been developed on
the
assumption
that it can be implemented without the acceptance of, or
interference
from, the
international community.”56
104.
The MOD
participants endorsed the PJHQ assessment.57
They stated
that,
although
the UK delegation had left Tampa “enormously heartened” by the
level of
detail in
US planning:
“… US
military (and other) planners have made a number of very big
assumptions
(eg that
they will remain welcome) in developing plans for delivering
success in the
aftermath.
The lack of clarity on how the medium- to long-term objectives will
be
delivered,
and how these will be conditioned by the short term, was our
greatest
area of
concern.”
105.
The Chiefs
of Staff approved the creation of the Common Document as
a
means to
establish a framework for UK policy that would guide those trying
to
influence
US thinking.
55
Minute DOMA
AD(ME) and Sec(0)4 to MA/DCDS(C), 27 January 2003, ‘US Iraq
Reconstruction
Conference
– Tampa 23-24 Jan 03’.
56
Minute Op
TELIC CPT Ldr to MA/DCJO(Ops), 24 January 2003, ‘Reconstruction
Planning Integration
Conference
held at US Central Command: 23/24 Jan 03’.
57
Minute DOMA
AD(ME) and Sec(0)4 to MA/DCDS(C), 27 January 2003, ‘US Iraq
Reconstruction
Conference
– Tampa 23-24 Jan 03’.
329