The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
poor
management by the Iraqi Government; and
•
a lack of
“strategic focus” by the CPA in the immediate post-conflict
period.
269.
The paper
advised that the Iraqi Government needed to develop a
long-term
energy
strategy which addressed subsidy and charging issues (power was
free). The
World Bank
had agreed to advise on strategy and co-ordination “with DFID
facilitating”.
270.
Given limited
UK funds, the UK was focusing on:
•
meeting key
short-term needs. The US$10m provided to Gen Riley
should
produce
25MW and £10m provided under the SIESP a further 50MW. In
the
longer-term,
the IISP should produce 160MW by April 2006;
•
leveraging
engagement from others, and;
•
providing
strategic advice to the Iraqi Government.
271.
The FCO/IPU
concluded that planned work was unlikely to solve Iraq’s
power
generation
problem in time for the summer. The UK should encourage the
Iraqi
Government
to plan now for next summer and the longer term, through the
development
of a
coherent strategy for the energy sector.
272.
In his
covering letter to Mr Blair, Mr Straw stated that 55
percent of DFID’s budget
for Iraq
for 2005/06 would be spent in the power sector.154
273.
Mr Blair
indicated that he had seen the letter, but did not comment on
it.155
274.
MND(SE) and
the DFID Basra Office reported on 30 March that they had
reached
agreement
on how to use the US$10m provided by DFID for power generation in
the
South.156
MND(SE) had
initially favoured diesel generators, DFID gas turbines. A
“hybrid
proposal”
had emerged, involving the purchase of diesel generators for fewer
sites than
originally
proposed and the refurbishment of existing gas turbines. MND(SE)
estimated
that the
project – Operation AMPERE – would produce an additional 16.5MW by
1 July.
It would
only be a temporary solution. DFID’s IISP would help to maintain
existing
capacity,
but substantive improvement would only come through long-term
restructuring,
institutional
reform and major capital investment. That agenda would be pursued
with
the
ITG.
275.
The effect of
Op AMPERE is considered later in this Section.
154
Letter
Straw to Blair, 24 March 2005, ‘Iraq: Ad Hoc Ministerial
Meetings’.
155
Manuscript
comment Blair on Note Quarrey to Prime Minister, 30 March 2005,
‘Iraq’.
156
Telegram 47
Basra to FCO London, 30 March 2005, ‘Iraq: Meeting Peak Power
Demands in the South
this
Summer’.
240