The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
42.
President
Bush’s State of the Union speech on 29 January 2002 referred to
Iraq,
Iran and
North Korea as “an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of
the world”.22
43.
The speech
prompted a major public debate on both sides of the Atlantic
about
policy
towards Iraq.
44.
The UK’s
response, discussions between No.10 and the White House, and
the
advice
commissioned by No.10, including a paper analysing the options on
Iraq
and
a paper for public consumption setting out the facts on WMD,
are addressed in
Section 3.2.
45.
Sir David
Manning was assured by Dr Condoleezza Rice, President Bush’s
National
Security
Advisor, that no decisions would be taken before the planned
meeting between
Mr Blair
and President Bush at Crawford in early April.23
46.
No.10
commissioned a number of papers to inform preparations for
Mr Blair’s
meeting
with President Bush.24
47.
By late
February, US military action to achieve regime change in Iraq later
that
year was
seen as a serious possibility.
48.
The Chiefs of
Staff were informed on 19 February that:
“A
sustained bombing campaign combined with internal opposition forces
plus US
covert
action would not be sufficient to effect a regime change. Any
ground invasion
if it was
perceived to be against the Sunni hegemony rather than that of
Saddam
himself,
would incur greater resistance … [T]he US would not be in a
position to
project
such a force until autumn 02. Basing in the region would be
problematic …
“US intent
appeared to be to stem the creeping tide of WMD. Given that
neither
arms
control or leverage were working, a line had to be drawn on the
issues and
in the case
of Iraq, the line had been reached … The US also had to consider
the
possibility
of Saddam retreating to the North of Iraq and the consequences
that
this could
have to maintaining another leader in Baghdad … COS [Chiefs of
Staff]
needed to
be more in tune with US planning and on message when speaking to
their
colleagues
abroad. COS therefore requested regular updates as the
FCO/MOD/US
49.
The thinking
in the MOD at the time, about the position in Iraq and the US
military
options, is
set out in more detail in the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS)
paper issued on
5 March,
which is addressed later in this Section.
22
The White
House, 29 January 2002, The
President’s State of the Union Address.
23
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 14 February 2002, ‘Conversation with Condi
Rice: Iraq’.
24
Public
hearing, 19 January 2011, page 34.
25
Minutes, 19
February 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
182