The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
426.
Mr Blair
stated that since 1998, there was evidence, including in the 6
September
IAEA
report, of continued development of WMD. He also thought that the
nature of
the Iraqi
regime “should become part of our case on WMD”; and that: “We
needed an
active
strategy to take the debate to the rest of the world.” He set out
the UK’s plans to
publish the
dossier within a few weeks. Mr Campbell emphasised the need
for people
“to understand
what BW actually did”; and that the “media threshold would be high,
so
the dossier
would need to include new facts from the last four
years”.
427.
During the
plenary meeting Mr Stephen Hadley, US Deputy National
Security
Advisor,
put forward principles for a post‑Saddam Hussein Iraq: territorial
integrity,
democracy,
and a role for the UN.
428.
Mr Rycroft’s
record of the plenary contained little of the substance addressed
in
the
restricted meeting. It was sent to the Private Secretaries to
Mr Hoon and the Cabinet
Secretary,
and to Sir Richard Dearlove, Sir Francis Richards,
Mr Scarlett, Mr Bowen,
Sir Christopher
Meyer and Sir Jeremy Greenstock. It was again marked personal
and it
is clear
from the copy on the FCO files that named senior officials were
allowed to read
the letter
only in Mr Straw’s Private Office.
429.
Mr Campbell
wrote in his diaries that Mr Blair “felt that his job was to
sell the
case for
the UN route to Cheney”.133
After the
private meeting, Sir David Manning had
said that
President Bush had used Mr Blair to persuade the Vice
President; and that
President
Bush had made up his mind on the threat and the need for the UN to
deal
with it.
430.
The official
record confirms that was the UK perception.134
431.
Mr Campbell
wrote that President Bush had told him:
“… it’s the
right thing to do and future generations will surely thank us. I
really
believe
that. I really believe the world has to get rid of Saddam and I
really
appreciate
y’all coming over.”135
432.
President
Bush wrote in his memoir that he had told Mr Blair at Camp
David
that he had
taken the decision to ask the UN for a resolution to disarm
Saddam
Hussein;
and that if diplomacy failed he would take military
action.
433.
President Bush
wrote in his memoir that following the attack of 11
September
2001, he
had chosen to pursue a policy of coercive diplomacy on
Iraq:
“My first
choice was to use diplomacy …
133
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
134
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 8 September 2002, ‘Your Visit to Camp
David on 7 September:
Conversation
with President Bush’.
135
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
166