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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
1350.  When Adm Boyce visited Turkey in late January, Mr Westmacott reported that
there were no instructions to reply to Mr Hoon’s letter.515
1351.  At Cabinet on 9 January Mr Hoon reported his visit to Turkey and the sensitivities
about actions involving Iraq.516
1352.  Other issues discussed are addressed in Section 3.6.
1353.  Mr Blair told Cabinet that there would be an “in‑depth” discussion on Iraq the
following week.
1354.  Adm Boyce updated Gen Myers on the outcome of the visit on 9 January and
outlined the UK’s “commitment to operations in southern Iraq.”517
1355.  The report of the discussion also stated that the US could stay poised for military
operations for 3‑4 months.
1356.  On 11 January, Mr Straw discussed the Turkish position with Secretary Powell,
including the need to avoid Turkey being drawn into any conflict in Iraq and the
practicalities of the northern option.518
1357.  Reporting from the British Embassy Washington showed that similar concerns
about permission had been discussed during Mr Ricketts’ visit.519
1358.  Sir Kevin Tebbit told the Inquiry that it was not until early January that the northern
option was “absolutely blocked off” after he and Mr Hoon went to Ankara “to make one
final effort to clarify what was going on”, including to secure “overflight rights for aircraft
and supplies”.520 But it had become “increasingly difficult to rely on the northern option”
from late November into December.
1359.  Mr Hoon told the Inquiry that his awareness of the difficulties with Turkey grew
“towards the end” of 2002.521 The UK had been alerted to the likely attitude of Turkey by
Secretary Powell. When Mr Hoon had visited in early January 2003 he had had “a very
rapid history lesson”; “all they were talking about was what had happened in the 1920s
and Britain could not entirely be trusted”.
1360.  Mr Hoon stated that he did not think the decision to abandon the northern option
was taken until after his visit to Ankara, when he formed the view that “we would never
515 Telegram 33 Ankara to FCO London, 24 January 2003, ‘CDS’s Call on Turkish CHOD: Iraq’.
516 Cabinet Conclusions, 9 January 2003.
517 Minute Zambellas to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 10 January 2003, ‘CDS Telephone call to CJCS:
9 Jan 03’.
518 Letter Straw to Manning, 13 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Colin Powell, 11 January’.
519 Telegram 46 Washington to FCO London, 14 January 2003, ‘Iraq: US Military Planning’.
520 Public hearing, 3 December 2009, pages 55‑56.
521 Public hearing, 19 January 2010, pages 58‑60.
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