3.6  |  Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003

• There were “strong indications that Iraq produced more anthrax than it declared,

and that at least some of this was retained after the declared destruction date.

It might still exist.”

• Iraq had not declared “a significant quantity of bacterial growth media” which had

been included in Iraq’s submission to the Amorim panel. This omission appeared

“to be deliberate as the pages of the resubmitted document were renumbered”.

The quantity of growth media involved would “suffice to produce … about

5,000 litres of concentrated anthrax”.

• The Al Samoud 2 and Al Fatah missiles “might well represent prima facie cases

of proscribed systems” but further technical consideration would be necessary

before reaching a conclusion on the issue.

• Iraq had refurbished its missile production infrastructure, including a number

of casting chambers which were capable of producing motors for missiles with

ranges greater than the 150km limit.

• Iraq had illegally imported 300 rocket engines which might be for the

Al Samoud 2, chemicals used in propellants and other potentially

proscribed items.

711.  Dr Blix questioned Iraq’s claims that there were no more documents about its

activities. After the discovery of documents in the home of a scientist “relating to the

laser enrichment of uranium”, UNMOVIC could not “help but think that the case might

not be isolated and that such placements of documents is deliberate to make discovery

difficult”. He warned that: “Any further sign of the concealment of documents would

be serious.”

712.  Dr Blix also questioned whether Iraq had provided a complete list of the names of

personnel who had worked on proscribed programmes, and pointed out the difficulties of

interviewing individuals “in private”. He reported that UNMOVIC had asked 11 individuals

for interview in Baghdad and that none of them would speak without the presence of an

Iraqi official.

713.  Dr ElBaradei reported that the IAEA had found no evidence that Iraq had

revived its nuclear weapons programme but it was still investigating a number

of issues and Iraq needed to shift from passive to pro‑active support.

714.  Dr ElBaradei called for a few months to verify Iraq’s nuclear disarmament

and to demonstrate that the inspection process worked as a central feature of

the international nuclear arms control regime.

715.  Dr ElBaradei reported that the IAEA had conducted 139 inspections at some

106 locations, with a “focus on areas of concern identified by other States, facilities

identified through satellite imagery as having been modified or constructed since 1998,

and other inspection leads identified independently”.244 They had been able to “gain

244  UN Press Release, 27 January 2003, Security Council briefed by Chief UN Weapons Experts on First

60 days of Inspections in Iraq (SC/7644).

127