The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
190.
In his speech
at College Station on 7 April, Mr Blair argued:
“Prevention
is better than cure. The reason it would be crazy for us to clear
out of
Afghanistan
once we had finished militarily, is that if it drifts back into
instability, the
same old
problems will re-emerge. Stick at it and we can show, eventually,
as in the
Balkans,
the unstable starts to become stable.”114
191.
Immediately
after Crawford, UK officials and the UK military began to
define
the
possible end state after a military operation against
Iraq.
192.
Section 6.1
describes how consideration of UK military options intensified
after
Crawford.
193.
On 8 April, Mr
Hoon discussed Iraq with Adm Boyce and Sir Kevin
Tebbit.115
Afterwards
he commissioned further work on potential military options, to be
conducted
“on very
close hold”.
194.
On 12 April,
Mr Webb sent Mr Hoon a “think piece”, listing three possible
US
options for
invasion and touching briefly on post-invasion
commitments:
“To secure
the country subsequently would depend critically on the extent of
popular
support:
but without it how could we justify staying? It is possible that
forces would
be needed
only sufficient to secure a new popular figure from being dislodged
by
dissident
remnants. But we have to be ready for a longer job against an
uncertain
background
of host nation support and regional instability.”116
195.
Mr Webb
suggested that:
“… there
could be advantage in the MOD doing some discreet internal
strategic
estimating.
This should help us think through what would be the key
strategic
objectives
and end states and the ‘centre of gravity’ of the situation we need
to
tackle; and
give better shape to redefining potential force packages (within
the
large region).
…
“Actively
to prepare for operations on Iraq would obviously attract interest
and
possibly
reactions … There would come a point at which preparations
could
apply some
valuable pressure on Saddam; or be seen as a natural reaction
to
prevarication
over inspections. In general, however, until that point – say in
the
summer – we
should keep a low profile, confining ourselves to the items
that
timeline
analysis shows need to be got underway to preserve the ability to
contribute
on time
later.
114
The
National Archives, 7 April 2002, Prime
Minister’s speech at the George Bush Senior
Presidential Library.
115
Minute
Watkins to PSO/CDS & PS/PUS [MOD], 8 April 2002,
‘Iraq’.
116
Minute Webb
to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 12 April 2002, ‘Bush and the War on
Terrorism’.
146