The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
67.
In relation to
his own position, the IPU suggested that Maj Gen Cross should
be
told that
he would be formally appointed as a deputy to the Head of ORHA only
once
a resolution
authorising its activity had been agreed.
68.
Alongside the
speaking note, the IPU also provided a four page review of UK
policy
on ORHA. In
it the IPU recommended that the UK should continue to commit
resources,
on the
basis that ORHA remained “the only game in town”, but noted that “a
situation
could arise
where ORHA was acting illegally”. That would have “implications”
for both
UK secondees
and ORHA operations in areas held by British forces. The IPU did
not
offer a
solution or recommendation if the situation did arise.
69.
At the end of
March, Mr Straw’s Private Secretary provided Mr Rycroft with an
IPU
paper
covering UK, European and US positions on post-conflict
arrangements and the
role of the
UN.32
The
covering letter said that:
“… our
views are almost certainly very close to those of France and
Germany …
I say
almost certainly because we have yet to test … views in
detail.”
70.
The letter
also said:
“One of the
lessons from negotiating UNSCR 1441 is that we need to share
our
initial
thinking with France, Germany and Russia at an early stage. We will
need
their
support if a UN resolution is to pass. We should not negotiate
texts, nor seek
a collective
position.”
71.
The IPU paper
included an assessment that EU member states were likely
to
want a
central role for the UN that was not subordinate to the Coalition
and that did not
legitimise
military action. The UN’s main contributions would be to building a
new Iraqi
Government
and managing Iraq’s natural resources.
72.
The FCO
proposed a series of bilateral meetings between UK Ministers
and
officials
and their counterparts to “share our thinking”, including a
conversation between
Mr Straw
and Secretary Powell. The IPU assessed that Security Council
endorsement
was
desirable rather than essential to the US; agreement on a
resolution was unlikely to
be reached
if the US retained the degree of control they wanted.
73.
On 31 March,
Mr Ricketts wrote to Mr Brenton about dialogue with
European
countries
on a resolution. He said:
“The Prime
Minister wants us to take our time over the issue of a
post-conflict
resolution.
The right time to bring this to a head is likely to be once we
have
reached, or
are near to, an end to the military conflict. That will be our
moment
of greatest
leverage in the Security Council.” 33
32
Letter Owen
to Rycroft, 31 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Phase IV’ attaching Paper IPU, 31
March 2003,
‘Iraq: Post-Conflict
Administration’.
33
Letter
Ricketts to Brenton, 31 March 2003, ‘Iraq
Reconstruction’.
142